Competition in Posted Prices With Bargaining
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References listed on IDEAS
- Spector, David, 2007. "Bundling, tying, and collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 575-581, June.
- Wang, Ruqu, 1995. "Bargaining versus posted-price selling," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 1747-1764, December.
- Arnold, Michael A & Lippman, Steven A, 1998. "Posted Prices versus Bargaining in Markets with Asymmetric Information," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(3), pages 450-457, July.
- Chen, Yongmin & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1996. "Asking Prices as Commitment Devices," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(1), pages 129-155, February.
- Gabriele Camera & Cemil Selcuk, 2009. "Price Dispersion with Directed Search," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(6), pages 1193-1224, December.
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- Daniel Herold, 2017. "The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201752, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Tamás Briglevics & Oz Shy, 2014.
"Why Don’t Most Merchants Use Price Discounts to Steer Consumer Payment Choice?,"
Review of Industrial Organization,
Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 44(4), pages 367-392, June.
- Tamás Briglevics & Oz Shy, 2012. "Why don’t most merchants use price discounts to steer consumer payment choice?," Public Policy Discussion Paper 12-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
More about this item
KeywordsPosted prices; list prices; collusion; bargaining; negotiation; haggling; discounts; outside option; price takers; Hotelling line;
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-02-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2013-02-03 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2013-02-03 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2013-02-03 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MKT-2013-02-03 (Marketing)
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