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Jobs with different wage determination mechanisms, social efficiency and unemployment

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  • Masui, Makoto

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to construct a theoretical framework for the labor market, which is composed of a variety of jobs with different wage determination mechanisms. We identify an equilibrium in which some firms post a wage and others bargain with workers. This paper shows that the proportion of firms adopting wage bargaining in a decentralized equilibrium is below the socially optimal level. We identify policies to increase this proportion and to improve social efficiency. Furthermore, we examine the impact of those policies on unemployment. The results of this study will determine the direction of employment policy on the labor market with various employment styles.

Suggested Citation

  • Masui, Makoto, 2011. "Jobs with different wage determination mechanisms, social efficiency and unemployment," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 56-75, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jjieco:v:25:y:2011:i:1:p:56-75
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Eguchi, Kyota, 2014. "Employment protection and incentives: Severance pay vs. procedural inconvenience," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 272-290.
    2. Makoto Masui, 2013. "Temporary Contracts, Employment Protection, and Collective Bargaining," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 27(4), pages 371-398, December.
    3. Kun Liang & Zhongfeng Li & Li Luo, 2023. "Measurement, dynamic evolution and influencing factors of green development efficiency in western China: Based on ecological-economic-social system," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 18(12), pages 1-27, December.

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