Bidding To Give: An Experimental Comparison Of Auctions For Charity
We experimentally compare three mechanisms used to raise money for charities: first-price winner-pay auctions, first-price all-pay auctions, and lotteries. We stay close to the characteristics of most charity auctions by using an environment with incomplete information and independent private values. Our results support theoretical predictions by showing that the all-pay format raises substantially higher revenue than the other mechanisms. Copyright � (2009) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Volume (Year): 50 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (05)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (215) 898-8487
Fax: (215) 573-2057
Web page: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/ier
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0020-6598 Email: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:50:y:2009:i:2:p:431-457. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.