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Tullock’s contest with reimbursements

Author

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  • Alexander Matros

    ()

  • Daniel Armanios

    ()

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Matros & Daniel Armanios, 2009. "Tullock’s contest with reimbursements," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 49-63, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:141:y:2009:i:1:p:49-63
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9436-9
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-009-9436-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. Vries, 2005. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(505), pages 583-601, July.
    2. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
    3. Richard L. Fullerton & R. Preston McAfee, 1999. "Auctioning Entry into Tournaments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 573-605, June.
    4. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2005. "Asymmetric contests with general technologies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 923-946, November.
    5. Cohen, Chen & Sela, Aner, 2005. "Manipulations in contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 135-139, January.
    6. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction
      [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]
      ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    7. Stefan Szymanski, 2003. "The Economic Design of Sporting Contests," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1137-1187, December.
    8. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2011. "Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 216-219, August.
    2. Matros, Alexander, 2012. "Sad-Loser contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 155-162.
    3. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2015. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 609-669, December.
    4. Gregor, Martin, 2012. "Contest for power in organizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 280-283.
    5. Gil S. Epstein & Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2013. "Lotteries vs. All-Pay Auctions in Fair and Biased Contests," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(1), pages 48-60, March.
    6. Subhasish Chowdhury & Roman Sheremeta, 2015. "Strategically equivalent contests," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 78(4), pages 587-601, April.
    7. Einav Hart & Judith Avrahami & Yaakov Kareev, 2016. "Enlarging the market yet decreasing the profit: An experimental study of competitive behavior when investment affects the prize," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 11(4), pages 380-390, July.
    8. Subhasish Chowdhury & Roman Sheremeta, 2011. "A generalized Tullock contest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 413-420, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contests; Reimbursement; D72; D74;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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