Tullock's Contest with Reimbursements
We consider Tullock’s contests with reimbursements. It turns out that the winner-reimbursed contest maximizes the net total spending while the loser-reimbursed contest minimizes the net total spending. We investigate properties of contests with reimbursements and compare them with the classic Tullock’s contest. Applications for R&D, government contracts, and elections are discussed.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2007|
|Date of revision:||Sep 2008|
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