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How lotteries outperform auctions for charity

Author

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  • BOS, Olivier

    () (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL). Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))

Abstract

In their recent paper Goeree et al. (2005) determine that all-pay auctions are better for fundraising activities than lotteries. We show that the introduction of asymmetry among valuations with complete information could reverse this result. Complete information seems well suited to some charity environments.

Suggested Citation

  • BOS, Olivier, 2009. "How lotteries outperform auctions for charity," CORE Discussion Papers 2009049, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2009049
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    File URL: http://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/coredp2009_49.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    all-pay auctions; charity; complete information; lotteries;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

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