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Eminent Paper Series The Present And Future Of Game Theory

Author

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  • MARTIN SHUBIK

    (Cowled Foundation, Department of Economics and School of Management, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281, USA)

Abstract

A broad nontechnical coverage of many of the developments in game theory since the 1950s is given, together with some comments on important open problems and where some of the developments may take place. The reference section given serves only as a minimal guide to the many thousands of books and articles that have been written on this topic. The purpose here is to present a broadbrush picture of the many areas of study and application that have come into being. The use of deep techniques flourishes best when it stays in touch with application. There is a vital symbiotic relationship between good theory and practice. The breakneck speed of development of game theory calls for an appreciation of both the many realities of conflict, coordination and cooperation and their abstract investigation.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Shubik, 2012. "Eminent Paper Series The Present And Future Of Game Theory," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 57(01), pages 1-14.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:serxxx:v:57:y:2012:i:01:n:s0217590812500014
    DOI: 10.1142/S0217590812500014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Friedman, James, 1993. "Oligopoly theory," Handbook of Mathematical Economics, in: K. J. Arrow & M.D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, edition 4, volume 2, chapter 11, pages 491-534, Elsevier.
    2. Huber, Juergen & Shubik, Martin & Sunder, Shyam, 2007. "Everyone-a-Banker or the Ideal Credit Acceptance Everyone-a-Banker or the Ideal Credit Acceptance," Working Papers 26, Yale University, Department of Economics.
    3. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    4. Rubinstein,Ariel, 2000. "Economics and Language," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521789905, January.
    5. Charles R. Plott, 2001. "Public Economics, Political Processes and Policy Applications," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 762.
    6. Joshua M. Epstein & Robert L. Axtell, 1996. "Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262550253, December.
    7. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game theory; application and theory; social sciences; law; experimental gaming; conflict; coordination and cooperation; C7; C9;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments

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