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Impact de l'organisation du marché: Comparaison de la négociation de gré à gré et des enchères descendantes

Author

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  • Alan Kirman

    () (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales)

  • Sonia Moulet

    () (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales)

Abstract

Nous comparons à l'aide d'un modèle multi-agents deux types d'organisations fréquemment rencontrées dans les marchés de biens périssables: les enchères simultanées descendantes ou enchères hollandaises, et la négociation de gré à gré sans prix affichés ; Notre approche consiste à étudier des populations d'agents artificiels -acheteurs et vendeurs- qui, par le biais de leurs expériences, vont apprendre à utiliser certaines règles de comportement ou "stratégies". Nous considérons deux types d'apprentissage: l'apprentissage de l'information pendant la journée et l'apprentissage des règles à travers les expériences dans le temps. Nous étudions le résultat d'un apprentissage (à base d'heuristiques) bien spécifié et nous déterminons si les allocations obtenues correspondent à certains critères d'efficacité.

Suggested Citation

  • Alan Kirman & Sonia Moulet, 2008. "Impact de l'organisation du marché: Comparaison de la négociation de gré à gré et des enchères descendantes," Working Papers halshs-00349034, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00349034
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00349034
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Juliette Rouchier, 2013. "The Interest of Having Loyal Buyers in a Perishable Market," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 41(2), pages 151-170, February.
    2. Gerard Ballot & Antoine Mandel & Annick Vignes, 2015. "Agent-based modeling and economic theory: where do we stand?," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 10(2), pages 199-220, October.

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