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What's that got to do with the price of fish? Buyers behavior on the Ancona fish market

Author

Listed:
  • Mauro Gallegati

    (Polytechnic University of Marche - Polytechnic University of Marche)

  • Gianfranco Giulioni

    (Ud'A - Università degli studi "G. d'Annunzio" Chieti-Pescara [Chieti-Pescara])

  • Alan Kirman

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Antonio Palestrini

    (UniTE - Università degli Studi di Teramo)

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the Ancona wholesale fish market (MERITAN) where transactions take place in three simultaneous Dutch auctions. Our objective is to characterize the behavior of market participants and, in particular, buyers in such a market structure. Our analysis of the data shows that buyer-seller relationships are less important than in a pairwise bargaining market such as the Marseille Fish market but that a significant amount of "loyalty" is still present under the auction mechanism. We provide an explanation of the "declining price paradox" for the fish market of Ancona by linking the rule used by the buyers to set their bid to the relationship between the variation in the price of the last transactions in the day and the quantity of fish available on that day. In fact, the average price tends to increase for last transactions on days characterized by limited supply of fish.

Suggested Citation

  • Mauro Gallegati & Gianfranco Giulioni & Alan Kirman & Antonio Palestrini, 2010. "What's that got to do with the price of fish? Buyers behavior on the Ancona fish market," Working Papers halshs-00545129, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00545129
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00545129
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    1. Complexity, & BBC bias
      by chris in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2016-01-25 20:07:40

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    2. Daniele Giachini, 2018. "Rationality and Asset Prices under Belief Heterogeneity," LEM Papers Series 2018/07, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
    3. Frédéric Salladarré & Patrice Guillotreau & Patrice Loisel & Pierrick Ollivier, 2015. "The declining price anomaly in sequential auctions with asymmetric buyers: Evidence from the Nephrops norvegicus market in France," Working Papers hal-01147207, HAL.
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    6. Wolff, François-Charles & Asche, Frank, 2022. "Pricing heterogeneity and transaction mode: Evidence from the French fish market," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 203(C), pages 67-79.
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    9. Vishnu V. Narayan & Enguerrand Prebet & Adrian Vetta, 2019. "The Declining Price Anomaly is not Universal in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions (but almost is)," Papers 1905.00853, arXiv.org.
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    14. Federica De Leo & Pier Paolo Miglietta & Slađana Pavlinović, 2014. "Marine Fisheries and Mariculture in Croatia: Economic and Trade Analysis," Journal of Economic and Financial Studies (JEFS), LAR Center Press, vol. 2(6), pages 53-61, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    wholesale fish market; Dutch auction;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery

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