Organization, learning and cooperation
This paper models the organization of the firm as a type of artificial neural network in a duopoly setting. The firm plays a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma type game, and must also learn to map environmental signals to demand parameters and to its rival's willingness to cooperate. We study the prospects for cooperation given the need for the firm to learn the environment and its rival's output. We show how profit and cooperation rates are affected by the sizes of both firms, their willingness to cooperate, and by environmental complexity. In addition, we investigate equilibrium firm size and cooperation rates.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Carley, Kathleen M., 1996. "A comparison of artificial and human organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 175-191, November.
- Joseph Henrich, 2001.
"In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 73-78, May.
- Ernst Fehr & Joseph Henrich & Robert Boyd, 2003. "In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small- Scale Societies," Microeconomics 0305009, EconWPA.
- Barr, Jason & Saraceno, Francesco, 2005. "Cournot competition, organization and learning," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 277-295, January.
- Green, Edward J. & Porter, Robert H., 1982.
"Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information,"
367, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
- Edward J Green & Robert H Porter, 1997. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1147, David K. Levine.
- Chung-Ming Kuan, 2006. "Artificial Neural Networks," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 06-A010, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
- Cyert, Richard M & DeGroot, Morris H, 1973. "An Analysis of Cooperation and Learning in a Duopoly Context," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(1), pages 24-37, March.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986.
"Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 1997. "Finite automata play the repeated prisioners dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1639, David K. Levine.
- Stephen J. DeCanio & William E. Watkins, .
"Information Processing and Organizational Structure,"
Computing in Economics and Finance 1997
163, Society for Computational Economics.
- DeCanio, Stephen J. & Watkins, William E., 1998. "Information processing and organizational structure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 275-294, August.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
- Chang, Myong-Hun & Harrington, Joseph Jr., 2006.
"Agent-Based Models of Organizations,"
Handbook of Computational Economics,
in: Leigh Tesfatsion & Kenneth L. Judd (ed.), Handbook of Computational Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 26, pages 1273-1337
- Joshua M. Epstein & Robert L. Axtell, 1996. "Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262550253, December.
- Barr, Jason & Saraceno, Francesco, 2002. "A computational theory of the firm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 345-361, November.
- Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
- Casson, Mark, 1991. "The Economics of Business Culture: Game Theory, Transaction Costs, and Economic Performance," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198283751, December.
- Tesfatsion, Leigh S., 2002. "Agent-Based Computational Economics: Growing Economies from the Bottom Up," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5075, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Radner, Roy, 1993. "The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1109-46, September.
- Miller, John H., 1996. "The coevolution of automata in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 87-112, January.
- Cho, In-Koo, 1994. "Bounded Rationality, Neural Network and Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(6), pages 935-57, October.
- Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2000. "An illustration of the essential difference between individual and social learning, and its consequences for computational analyses," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 1-19, January.
- Verboven, Frank, 1997. "Collusive behavior with heterogeneous firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 121-136, May.
- Ho, Teck-Hua, 1996. "Finite automata play repeated prisoner's dilemma with information processing costs," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-3), pages 173-207.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:70:y:2009:i:1-2:p:39-53. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.