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Cournot competition, organization and learning

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  • Barr, Jason
  • Saraceno, Francesco

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  • Barr, Jason & Saraceno, Francesco, 2005. "Cournot competition, organization and learning," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 277-295, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:29:y:2005:i:1-2:p:277-295
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bischi, Gian Italo & Kopel, Michael, 2001. "Equilibrium selection in a nonlinear duopoly game with adaptive expectations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 73-100, September.
    2. Thomas Riechmann, 2002. "Agent Based Cournot Games," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002 86, Society for Computational Economics.
    3. Cho, In-Koo, 1994. "Bounded Rationality, Neural Network and Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(6), pages 935-957, October.
    4. Barr, Jason & Saraceno, Francesco, 2002. "A computational theory of the firm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 345-361, November.
    5. Cyert, Richard M & DeGroot, Morris H, 1973. "An Analysis of Cooperation and Learning in a Duopoly Context," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(1), pages 24-37, March.
    6. DeCanio, Stephen J. & Watkins, William E., 1998. "Information processing and organizational structure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 275-294, August.
    7. Puu, T., 1998. "The chaotic duopolists revisited," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(3-4), pages 385-394, January.
    8. Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2000. "An illustration of the essential difference between individual and social learning, and its consequences for computational analyses," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 1-19, January.
    9. G.I. Bischi, & C. Chiarella & M. Kopel, 2002. "On Market Games with Misspecified Demand Functions : Long Run Outcomes and Global Dynamics," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002 27, Society for Computational Economics.
    10. Verboven, Frank, 1997. "Collusive behavior with heterogeneous firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 121-136, May.
    11. Hao Li, 1999. "Hierarchies and information-processing organizations," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(2), pages 101-126.
    12. Carley, Kathleen M., 1996. "A comparison of artificial and human organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 175-191, November.
    13. Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
    14. Radner, Roy, 1993. "The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1109-1146, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chang, Myong-Hun & Harrington, Joseph Jr., 2006. "Agent-Based Models of Organizations," Handbook of Computational Economics, in: Leigh Tesfatsion & Kenneth L. Judd (ed.), Handbook of Computational Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 26, pages 1273-1337, Elsevier.
    2. Jason Barr & Francesco Saraceno, 2005. "Modeling the Firm as an Artificial Neural Network," Working Papers Rutgers University, Newark 2005-011, Department of Economics, Rutgers University, Newark.
    3. Francesco Saraceno & Jason Barr, 2008. "Cournot competition and endogenous firm size," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 18(5), pages 615-638, October.
    4. Fioretti, Guido, 2006. "Recognising investment opportunities at the onset of recoveries," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 69-84, June.
    5. Barr, Jason & Saraceno, Francesco, 2009. "Organization, learning and cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 39-53, May.
    6. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/9832 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/9832 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/6782 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Sgroi, Daniel & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2009. "Learning to play 3×3 games: Neural networks as bounded-rational players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 27-38, January.
    10. Szymon Chudziak, 2025. "Studying economic complexity with agent-based models: advances, challenges and future perspectives," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 20(2), pages 413-449, April.
    11. James Fain, 2023. "Should retail stores locate close to a rival?," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 18(1), pages 129-162, January.
    12. Malcolm Brady, 2021. "A Game-Theoretic Model of Strategic Interaction Using Advertising: Simulating the Evolution of the Cournot Nash Equilibrium under Different Competitive Scenarios," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-16, November.
    13. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/9832 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/6782 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Steven Kimbrough & Frederic Murphy, 2009. "Learning to Collude Tacitly on Production Levels by Oligopolistic Agents," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 33(1), pages 47-78, February.
    16. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/9832 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/6782 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Francesco Saraceno & Jason Barr, 2008. "Cournot competition and endogenous firm size," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 18(5), pages 615-638, October.
    19. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/6782 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Silveira, Douglas & Vasconcelos, Silvinha, 2020. "Essays on duopoly competition with asymmetric firms: Is profit maximization always an evolutionary stable strategy?," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 225(C).
    21. A. A. Elsadany & A. M. Awad, 2016. "Dynamical analysis and chaos control in a heterogeneous Kopel duopoly game," Indian Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics, Springer, vol. 47(4), pages 617-639, December.

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