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Competitive Dynamics Between MNOs in the Mobile Telecommunications Single Market: Lessons from the U.S. Experience

Author

Listed:
  • Laurent BENZONI

    (Sorbonne Universités, Paris)

  • Bruno DEFFAINS

    (Sorbonne Universités, Paris)

  • Anh Tuc NGUYEN

    (Tera Consultants, Paris)

  • Olivier SALESSE

    (Tera Consultants, Paris)

Abstract

Within the framework of the Digital Single Market, the European Commission is paving the way for a Single Market in the European mobile telecommunications services by, among others, studying how to reduce regulation heterogeneity in the 27 fragmented national markets. This article aims to complement this initiative by analysing the U.S. experience and drawing lessons that the potential unified European mobile market can benefit from regarding the small operators in the market. Three major points are identified in order to create an internal market for mobile telecommunications with high competitive dynamics: to prevent market consolidation by a limited number of large operators, to block practices that raise barriers to competition by the dominant operators such as exclusive handset arrangements, and finally, to adopt harmonised and favourable measures to include second-mover operators in the competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Laurent BENZONI & Bruno DEFFAINS & Anh Tuc NGUYEN & Olivier SALESSE, 2011. "Competitive Dynamics Between MNOs in the Mobile Telecommunications Single Market: Lessons from the U.S. Experience," Communications & Strategies, IDATE, Com&Strat dept., vol. 1(82), pages 127-145, 2nd quart.
    • Handle: RePEc:idt:journl:cs8206
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Alison BUNEL & Denis LESCOP, 2014. "How Spectrum Policy Could (or Could Not) Achieve a Single Market for Electronic Communications…," Communications & Strategies, IDATE, Com&Strat dept., vol. 1(93), pages 81-97, 1st quart.
    2. Tangerås, Thomas P. & Tåg, Joacim, 2016. "International network competition under national regulation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 152-185.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Single Market; competitive dynamics; harmonisation; main mobile groups; telecommunication services.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law

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