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Stackelberg Leadership and Transfers in Private Provision of Public Goods

  • Buchhilz, W.
  • Konrad, K.A.
  • Lommerund, K.E.

We consider transfers in a Stackelberg game of private provision of a public good. It turns out that the agent who is the follower in the process of making voluntary contributions to a public good may have an incentive to make monetary transfers to the Stackelberg leader even in a situation where neither has a comparative advantage in making contributions to the public good.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bergen in its series Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen with number 170.

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Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:bereco:170
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway
Phone: (+47)55589200
Fax: (+47)55589210
Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/
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