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Stackelberg Leadership and Transfers in Private Provision of Public Goods


  • Buchhilz, W.
  • Konrad, K.A.
  • Lommerund, K.E.


We consider transfers in a Stackelberg game of private provision of a public good. It turns out that the agent who is the follower in the process of making voluntary contributions to a public good may have an incentive to make monetary transfers to the Stackelberg leader even in a situation where neither has a comparative advantage in making contributions to the public good.

Suggested Citation

  • Buchhilz, W. & Konrad, K.A. & Lommerund, K.E., 1997. "Stackelberg Leadership and Transfers in Private Provision of Public Goods," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 170, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:bereco:170

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1989. "Government procurement and international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3-4), pages 291-308, May.
    2. Cabral, Luis M B & Greenstein, Shane, 1990. "Switching Costs and Bidding Parity in Government Procurement of Computer Systems," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 453-469, Fall.
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    5. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1990. "Analysis of Hidden Gaming in a Three-Level Hierarchy," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 301-324, Fall.
    6. Vagstad, Steinar, 1995. "Promoting fair competition in public procurement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 283-307, October.
    7. Nahum D. Melumad & Toshiyuki Shibano, 1991. "Communication in Settings with No. Transfers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 173-198, Summer.
    8. Melumad, Nahum D. & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1989. "Value of communication in agencies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 334-368, April.
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    10. repec:bla:joares:v:25:y:1987:i::p:1-21 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Vicary, Simon & Sandler, Todd, 2002. "Weakest-link public goods: Giving in-kind or transferring money," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1501-1520, September.
    2. Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2005. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(2), pages 543-566.
    3. Andreas Löschel & Dirk Rübbelke, 2014. "On the Voluntary Provision of International Public Goods," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 81(322), pages 195-204, April.
    4. Rudolf Kerschbamer & Clemens Puppe, 1998. "Voluntary contributions when the public good is not necessarily normal," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 68(2), pages 175-192, June.
    5. Clemens Puppe & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2001. "Sequential contributions to public goods: on the structure of the equilibrium set," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 8(3), pages 1-7.
    6. Russo, Giuseppe & Senatore, Luigi, 2012. "A note on contribution games with loss functions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 211-214.
    7. Miriam Beblo & Julio Robledo, 2008. "The wage gap and the leisure gap for double-earner couples," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 21(2), pages 281-304, April.
    8. Andaluz, Joaquín & Marcén, Miriam & Molina, José Alberto, 2008. "Dynamics of Intrahousehold Bargaining," IZA Discussion Papers 3757, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    9. Joachim Weimann, 2010. "Politikberatung und die Verhaltensökonomie: Eine Fallstudie zu einem schwierigen Verhältnis," Schmollers Jahrbuch : Journal of Applied Social Science Studies / Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 130(3), pages 279-296.
    10. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2007. "Aggregative Public Good Games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(2), pages 201-219, April.
    11. Kessing, Sebastian Georg, 2003. "Delay in joint projects
      [Verzögerung bei gemeinsamen Projekten]
      ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2003-15, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).

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    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods


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