On Private Incentives to Acquire Household Production Skills
In non-cooperative models of the family, improved productivity in contribution to a family good typically implies that, in equilibrium, one contributes more to the public good, while one's spouse contributes less. Thus, improves contribution productivity has a negative strategic effect on one's utility. We show that this strategic effect tends to be stronger the lower is one's initial contribution productivity. Therefore, the most productive has the strongest incentives to improve his or her productivity, widening any initial productivity differences. Similar results are also obtained in a cooperative bargaining model with non-cooperation as the threat point.
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Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/
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