Specialization in the Bargaining Family
We develop a two period family decision making model in which spouses bargain over their contributions to a family public good and the distribution of private consumption. In contrast to most models in the literature, specialization within the couple emerges endogenously from the production of the public good, and is not caused by exogenous differences between the spouses. Increasing marginal benefits of labour market experience make specialization efficient, even if both spouses have equal market and household productivities on the outset. If spouses are not able to enter into a binding contract governing the distribution of private consumption in the second period, the spouse specialized in market labour cannot commit to compensate the other spouse for foregone investments in earnings power. As a consequence, this spouse may withdraw part of his/her contribution and the provision level of the household good is likely to be inefficiently low.
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- Steinar Vagstad, 2001.
"On private incentives to acquire household production skills,"
Journal of Population Economics,
Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 14(2), pages 301-312.
- Vagstad, S., 1999. "On Private Incentives to Acquire Household Production Skills," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 1499, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
- Vagstad, S., 2001. "On Private Incentives to Aquire Household Production Skills," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 221, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
- Konrad, Kai A & Lommerud, Kjell Erik, 1995. " Family Policy with Non-cooperative Families," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(4), pages 581-601, December.
- Schönberg, Uta & Ludsteck, Johannes, 2007. "Maternity Leave Legislation, Female Labor Supply, and the Family Wage Gap," IZA Discussion Papers 2699, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, October.
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