On private incentives to acquire household production skills
In non-cooperative family models, being good at contributing to family public goods like household production may reduce one's utility, since it tends to crowd out contributions from one's spouse. Similar effects also arise in cooperative models with non-cooperative threat point: improved contribution productivity entails loss of bargaining power. This strategic effect must be traded against the benefits of household production skills, in terms of increased consumption possibilities. Since cooperation involves extensive specialization, incentives to acquire household production skills are strikingly asymmetric, with the one not specializing in household production having strong disincentives for household skill acquisition.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 14 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Note:||Received: 06 July 1999/Accepted: 08 June 2000|
|Contact details of provider:|| Phone: +43-70-2468-8236|
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00148/index.htm
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jopoec:v:14:y:2001:i:2:p:301-312. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Christopher F Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.