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Who contributes? A strategic approach to a European immigration policy

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  • Giuseppe Russo
  • Luigi Senatore

Abstract

Who pays for immigration control? According to the Lisbon Treaty the cost of enforcing the European border against illegal immigration shall be shared among the EU members. Nonetheless, the Treaty is vague with respect to the “appropriate measures” to adopt in order to distribute the financial burden. Members who do not share their borders with source countries have an incentive to free ride on the other countries. We study a novel contribution game in which a border country and a central country minimize a loss function with respect to their national immigration target. We consider both sequential and simultaneous decisions and we show that joint contribution occurs only if the immigration targets are not too different. Total contribution is higher in the simultaneous game, but the sequential framework reduces the incentive to free ride. Jel codes D78, H72, H77 Copyright Russo and Senatore; licensee Springer. 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Giuseppe Russo & Luigi Senatore, 2013. "Who contributes? A strategic approach to a European immigration policy," IZA Journal of Migration and Development, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 2(1), pages 1-16, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:izamig:v:2:y:2013:i:1:p:1-16:10.1186/2193-9039-2-16
    DOI: 10.1186/2193-9039-2-16
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    Cited by:

    1. Kaz Miyagiwa & Yasuhiro Sato, 2019. "Illegal immigration, unemployment, and multiple destinations," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 118-144, January.
    2. Senatore, L, 2011. "Public Good Provision with Convex Costs," MPRA Paper 36984, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Policy making; Government expenditures; Local government expenditures; Federalism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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