Aging, Factor Returns, and Immigration Policy
In this note we analyze how aging affects immigration policy. We set up a dynamic political-economy model of representative democracy in which the government of the destination country sets the immigration level to maximize aggregate welfare of the constituency. Aging, i.e. a decline in the growth rate of the native population, has an expansionary effect on immigration. This immigration effect may even overcompensate the initial decline in population growth such that the total labor force grows more strongly and the capital stock per worker declines. We also compare our results to the social planner allocation and to the median-voter equilibrium.
|Date of creation:||2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Forthcoming in|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Universitätsstraße 25, 35037 Marburg|
Web page: http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:200926. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bernd Hayo)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.