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A political economy model of immigration quotas

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  • J. Amegashie

Abstract

The paper examines a model in which the number of immigrants allowed into a country is the outcome of a costly political lobbying contest between a firm and a union. The union and the firm bargain over the wage of natives after the number of immigrants that will be permitted is known. I assume that the lobbying contest is an all-pay auction (i.e., the lobbyist with the higher effort wins with certainty). Comparative statics results are derived to show how the reservation wage of immigrants, the price of the firm’s product, the size of the union and the cost of lobbying affect immigration quotas and the post-immigration wage of natives. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Suggested Citation

  • J. Amegashie, 2004. "A political economy model of immigration quotas," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 255-267, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:5:y:2004:i:3:p:255-267
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-004-0078-6
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Facchini, Giovanni & Mayda, Anna Maria & Mishra, Prachi, 2011. "Do interest groups affect US immigration policy?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 114-128, September.
    2. Carlotta Berti Ceroni & Giorgio Bellettini, 2004. "Unions and the political economy of immigration," 2004 Meeting Papers 494, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Facchini, Giovanni & Mayda, Anna Maria & Mishra, Prachi, 2007. "Do Interest Groups Affect Immigration?," IZA Discussion Papers 3183, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Gil Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006. "The struggle over migration policy," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 19(4), pages 703-723, October.
    5. Gil S. Epstein & Odelia Heizler (Cohen), 2008. "Illegal migration, enforcement, and minimum wage," Research in Labor Economics, in: Work, Earnings and Other Aspects of the Employment Relation, pages 197-224, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    6. Simon Guidecoq & Michel Rocca, 2010. "Réforme "Obama" de la politique d'immigration et pronostics des théories économiques : les influences de la majorité politique et de la conjoncture économique," Post-Print halshs-00560088, HAL.
    7. Benjamin Powell, 2012. "Coyote ugly: the deadweight cost of rent seeking for immigration policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 195-208, January.
    8. G. Bellettini & C. Berti Ceroni, 2004. "A positive analysis of immigration policy," Working Papers 520, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    9. Bertrand CRETTEZ, 2011. "Is Selling Immigration Rights Politically Sustainable ?," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2011042, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    10. Tapio Palokangas, 2008. "Self-Interested Governments, Unionization, and Legal and Illegal Immigration," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(1), pages 007-020, March.
    11. Giorgio Bellettini & Carlotta Berti Ceroni, 2005. "When the Union Hurts the Workers: A Positive Analysis of Immigration Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 1421, CESifo.
    12. Lena Calahorrano & Oliver Lorz, 2011. "Aging, Factor Returns, and Immigration Policy," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 58(5), pages 589-606, November.
    13. Gil Epstein, 2006. "The political economy of population economics," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 19(2), pages 255-257, June.
    14. Gil S. Epstein, 2013. "Frontier issues of the political economy of migration," Chapters, in: Amelie F. Constant & Klaus F. Zimmermann (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Migration, chapter 22, pages 411-431, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    15. Giuseppe Russo & Luigi Senatore, 2013. "Who contributes? A strategic approach to a European immigration policy," IZA Journal of Migration and Development, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 2(1), pages 1-16, December.
    16. Ken Yahagi, 2018. "Private law enforcement with competing groups," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 285-297, August.
    17. Giuseppe Russo, 2011. "Voting over selective immigration policies with immigration aversion," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 325-351, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers

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