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A political economy model of immigration quotas

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  • J. Amegashie

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Abstract

The paper examines a model in which the number of immigrants allowed into a country is the outcome of a costly political lobbying contest between a firm and a union. The union and the firm bargain over the wage of natives after the number of immigrants that will be permitted is known. I assume that the lobbying contest is an all-pay auction (i.e., the lobbyist with the higher effort wins with certainty). Comparative statics results are derived to show how the reservation wage of immigrants, the price of the firm’s product, the size of the union and the cost of lobbying affect immigration quotas and the post-immigration wage of natives. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Suggested Citation

  • J. Amegashie, 2004. "A political economy model of immigration quotas," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 255-267, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:5:y:2004:i:3:p:255-267
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-004-0078-6
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bertrand CRETTEZ, 2011. "Is Selling Immigration Rights Politically Sustainable ?," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2011042, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    2. Carlotta Berti Ceroni & Giorgio Bellettini, 2004. "Unions and the political economy of immigration," 2004 Meeting Papers 494, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Facchini, Giovanni & Mayda, Anna Maria & Mishra, Prachi, 2007. "Do Interest Groups Affect Immigration?," IZA Discussion Papers 3183, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    4. Gil Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006. "The struggle over migration policy," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 19(4), pages 703-723, October.
    5. Tapio Palokangas, 2008. "Self-Interested Governments, Unionization, and Legal and Illegal Immigration," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(1), pages 007-020, March.
    6. Epstein, Gil S. & Heizler (Cohen), Odelia, 2007. "Illegal Migration, Enforcement and Minimum Wage," IZA Discussion Papers 2830, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    7. Giorgio Bellettini & Carlotta Berti Ceroni, 2005. "When the Union Hurts the Workers: A Positive Analysis of Immigration Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 1421, CESifo Group Munich.
    8. Gil S. Epstein, 2013. "Frontier issues of the political economy of migration," Chapters,in: International Handbook on the Economics of Migration, chapter 22, pages 411-431 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Facchini, Giovanni & Mayda, Anna Maria & Mishra, Prachi, 2011. "Do interest groups affect US immigration policy?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 114-128, September.
    10. Simon Guidecoq & Michel Rocca, 2010. "Réforme "Obama" de la politique d'immigration et pronostics des théories économiques : les influences de la majorité politique et de la conjoncture économique," Post-Print halshs-00560088, HAL.
    11. Gil Epstein, 2006. "The political economy of population economics," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 19(2), pages 255-257, June.
    12. Benjamin Powell, 2012. "Coyote ugly: the deadweight cost of rent seeking for immigration policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 195-208, January.
    13. Giuseppe Russo, 2011. "Voting over selective immigration policies with immigration aversion," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 325-351, December.
    14. G. Bellettini & C. Berti Ceroni, 2004. "A positive analysis of immigration policy," Working Papers 520, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.

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