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The Struggle over Migration Policy

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  • Epstein, Gil S.

    () (Bar-Ilan University)

  • Nitzan, Shmuel

    () (Bar-Ilan University)

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the endogenous determination of migration quota viewing it as an outcome of a two-stage political struggle between two interest groups: those in favor and those against the proposed migration quota. We first compare the proposed policies of the two interest groups under random behavior of the government, with and without lobbying. The paper proceeds with the examination of the effect of government intervention in the proposal of the quota on its nature, assuming that, with and without government intervention, the uncertain approval of the proposal is the outcome of a lobbying contest between the two interest groups. Finally, we examine the effect that the status-quo policy has on the proposed government's policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Epstein, Gil S. & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2005. "The Struggle over Migration Policy," IZA Discussion Papers 1533, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1533
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bertrand CRETTEZ, 2011. "Is Selling Immigration Rights Politically Sustainable ?," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2011042, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    2. Carlotta Berti Ceroni & Giorgio Bellettini, 2004. "Unions and the political economy of immigration," 2004 Meeting Papers 494, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Snir, Avichai & Levy, Daniel, 2010. "Economic Growth in the Potterian Economy," EconStor Open Access Articles, ZBW - German National Library of Economics, pages 211-236.
    4. Camila Gracheva & Leonid Polishchuk & Koen Schoors & Alexander Yarkin, 2015. "Institutions and Visa Regimes," HSE Working papers WP BRP 114/EC/2015, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    5. Avichai Snir & Daniel Levy, 2005. "Popular Perceptions and Political Economy in the Contrived World of Harry Potter," Others 0509012, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 04 Jan 2006.
    6. Milo Bianchi, 2013. "Immigration Policy and Self-Selecting Migrants," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(1), pages 1-23, February.
    7. Gil S. Epstein & Odelia Heizler (Cohen), 2008. "Illegal migration, enforcement, and minimum wage," Research in Labor Economics,in: Work, Earnings and Other Aspects of the Employment Relation, volume 28, pages 197-224 Emerald Publishing Ltd.
    8. Giovanni Facchini & Cecilia Testa, 2010. "The rhetoric of closed borders: quotas, lax enforcement and illegal migration," Norface Discussion Paper Series 2010001, Norface Research Programme on Migration, Department of Economics, University College London.
    9. Giorgio Bellettini & Carlotta Berti Ceroni, 2005. "When the Union Hurts the Workers: A Positive Analysis of Immigration Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 1421, CESifo Group Munich.
    10. Milo Bianchi, 2013. "Immigration Policy and Self-Selecting Migrants," Post-Print hal-01629740, HAL.
    11. Gil S. Epstein, 2013. "Frontier issues of the political economy of migration," Chapters,in: International Handbook on the Economics of Migration, chapter 22, pages 411-431 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    12. Leonid Azarnert, 2010. "Après nous le Déluge: fertility and the intensity of struggle against immigration," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 23(4), pages 1339-1349, September.
    13. Spiros Bougheas & Douglas R. Nelson, 2012. "Skilled Worker Migration and Trade: Inequality and Welfare," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(2), pages 197-215, February.
    14. Milo Bianchi, 2008. "Immigration policy and self-selecting migrants," Working Papers halshs-00587710, HAL.
    15. Michele Moretto & Sergio Vergalli, 2008. "Managing Migration through Quotas: an Option-theory Perspective," Working Papers 2008.51, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    16. Michele Moretto & Sergio Vergalli, 2010. "Managing Migration Through Conflicting Policies: An Option-Theory Perspective," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 57(s1), pages 318-342, July.
    17. Münster, Johannes, 2005. "Lobbying contests with endogenous policy proposals
      [Lobby Wettkämpfe mit endogenen Politikvorschlägen]
      ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2005-11, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    18. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5377 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Jesús Clemente & Gemma Larramona, 2012. "Can a legalization programme for immigrants generate conflict among natives?," Chapters,in: Migration Impact Assessment, chapter 11, pages 365-386 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    20. Giuseppe Russo, 2011. "Voting over selective immigration policies with immigration aversion," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 325-351, December.
    21. G. Bellettini & C. Berti Ceroni, 2004. "A positive analysis of immigration policy," Working Papers 520, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    22. Hanson, Gordon H., 2010. "International Migration and the Developing World," Handbook of Development Economics, Elsevier.
    23. Amegashie, J.A., 2002. "A Political Economy Model of Immigration Quotas," Working Papers 2002-9, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    24. Münster, Johannes, 2005. "Lobbying contests with endogenous policy proposals," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 41, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    25. Inaam Chaabane & Damien Gaumont, 2015. "An alternative model of international migration: endogenous two sided borders and optimal legal systems," IZA Journal of Migration and Development, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 4(1), pages 1-23, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    interest groups; government intervention; migration quota;

    JEL classification:

    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
    • J81 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - Working Conditions

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