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The Why, When and How of Immigration Amnesties

Author

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  • Gil S. Epstein

    (Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University)

  • Avi Weiss

    (Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University)

Abstract

This paper presents some of the many issues involved in the granting of an amnesty to illegal immigrants. Complementing studies by Chau (2001, 2003), Karlson and Katz (2003) and Gang and Yun (2006), we consider government behavior with respect to allocations on limiting infiltration (border control) and apprehending infiltrators (internal control) and with respect to the granting of amnesties, the timing of amnesties, and limitations on eligibility for those amnesties. We demonstrate the effects of government actions on allocations and the flow of immigrants, and how the interactions between these factors combine to yield an optimal amnesty policy. We also consider two extensions – intertemporal transfers of policing funds and “fuzziness” in declarations regarding eligibility for an amnesty aimed at apprehending and deporting undesirables.

Suggested Citation

  • Gil S. Epstein & Avi Weiss, 2009. "The Why, When and How of Immigration Amnesties," Working Papers 2009-24, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:biu:wpaper:2009-24
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mayr, Karin & Minter, Steffen & Krieger, Tim, 2012. "Policies on illegal immigration in a federation," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 153-165.
    2. Gil S. Epstein & Odelia Heizler (Cohen), 2008. "Illegal migration, enforcement, and minimum wage," Research in Labor Economics, in: Work, Earnings and Other Aspects of the Employment Relation, pages 197-224, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    3. Alessandra Casarico & Giovanni Facchini & Tommaso Frattini, 2012. "Spending more is spending less: on the desirability of enforcing migration," Norface Discussion Paper Series 2012006, Norface Research Programme on Migration, Department of Economics, University College London.
    4. Arye L. Hillman & Ngo Long, 2022. "Immigrants as future voters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 149-174, January.
    5. Magris, Francesco & Russo, Giuseppe, 2016. "Fiscal Revenues and Commitment in Immigration Amnesties," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 75-90.
    6. Fabio Méndez & Facundo Sepúlveda & Nieves Valdés, 2016. "Legalization and human capital accumulation," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 29(3), pages 721-756, July.
    7. Casarico, Alessandra & Facchini, Giovanni & Frattini, Tommaso, 2018. "What drives the legalization of immigrants? Evidence from IRCA," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 258-273.
    8. Djajić, Slobodan & Vinogradova, Alexandra, 2013. "Undocumented migrants in debt," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 15-24.
    9. Slobodan Djajić & Michael S. Michael, 2014. "Controlling Illegal Immigration: On the Scope for Cooperation with a Transit Country," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(4), pages 808-824, September.
    10. Alessandra Casarico & Giovanni Facchini & Tommaso Frattini, 2012. "Spending More is Spending Less: Policy Dilemmas on Irregular Migration," Development Working Papers 330, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano, revised 27 Mar 2012.
    11. Giuseppe Russo, 2011. "Voting over selective immigration policies with immigration aversion," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 325-351, December.
    12. de la Rica, Sara & Glitz, Albrecht & Ortega, Francesc, 2013. "Immigration in Europe: Trends, Policies and Empirical Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 7778, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    13. Basu, Arnab K. & Chau, Nancy H. & Park, Brian, 2022. "Rethinking border enforcement, permanent and circular migration," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    14. Mark G. Guzman & Joseph H. Haslag & Pia M. Orrenius, 2015. "Government policy under price uncertainty: A source of volatility in illegal immigration," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(3), pages 940-962, August.
    15. Alessandra Casarico & Giovanni Facchini & Tommaso Frattini, 2012. "What Drives Immigration Amnesties?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3981, CESifo.
    16. Francesco Fasani, 2018. "Immigrant crime and legal status: evidence from repeated amnesty programs," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(4), pages 887-914.
    17. Claus-Jochen Haake & Tim Krieger & Steffen Minter, 2013. "On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 583-612, December.
    18. Gemma Larramona & Marcos Sanso-Navarro, 2016. "Do Regularization Programs for Illegal Immigrants Have a Magnet Effect? Evidence from Spain," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 84(2), pages 296-311, March.
    19. Mangin, Sephorah & Zenou, Yves, 2016. "Illegal migration and policy enforcement," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 83-86.

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    JEL classification:

    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy
    • H59 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Other

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