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Sale of visas: a smuggler's final song?

  • Auriol, A.
  • Mesnard, A.

Is there a way of eliminating human smuggling? We set up a model to simultaneously determine the provision of human smuggling services and the demand from would-be migrants. A visa-selling policy may be successful at eliminating smugglers by eroding their profits but it also increases immigration. In contrast, repression decreases migration but fuels cartelized smugglers. To overcome this trade-off we show that legalisation through selling visas in combination with repression can be used to eliminate human smuggling while controlling migration flows. Simulations of the policy highlight the complementarities between repression and selling visas and call into question current policies.

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File URL: http://city.eprints.org/2920/1/13_06_Auriol_Mesnard.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, City University London in its series Working Papers with number 13/06.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:cty:dpaper:13/06
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, Social Sciences Building, City University London, Whiskin Street, London, EC1R 0JD, United Kingdom,
Phone: +44 (0)20 7040 8500
Web page: http://www.city.ac.uk

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