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Return Migration and Illegal Immigration Control

  • Alexander Kemnitz

    ()

    (TU Dresden)

  • Karin Mayr

    ()

    (University of Vienna)

This paper investigates the effectiveness of immigration control policies when the duration of stay of illegal immigrants is endogenous because they may return home voluntarily. It shows that return intentions matter. First, we find that spending on border enforcement can potentially increase the total amount of illegal labor in the receiving country. This is because, while fewer illegals enter the country, those who do enter stay longer. Second, in-site inspections reduce illegal labor, unless there is an amnesty: then, they can have the opposite effect. Third, fines on apprehended migrants have only limited effect.

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File URL: http://www.norface-migration.org/publ_uploads/NDP_40_12.pdf
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Paper provided by Norface Research Programme on Migration, Department of Economics, University College London in its series Norface Discussion Paper Series with number 2012040.

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Date of creation: Dec 2012
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Handle: RePEc:nor:wpaper:2012040
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  1. Ethier, Wilfred J, 1986. "Illegal Immigration: The Host-Country Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 56-71, March.
  2. Entorf, Horst, 2000. "Rational Migration Policy Should Tolerate Non-Zero Illegal Migration Flows: Lessons from Modelling the Market for Illegal Migration," IZA Discussion Papers 199, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Gil S. Epstien & Avi Weiss, 2001. "A Theory of Immigration Amnesties," Working Papers 2001-09, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
  4. Nicola D. Coniglio & Giuseppe De Arcangelis & Laura Serlenga, 2009. "Intentions to Return of Clandestine Migrants: The Perverse Effect of Illegality on Skills," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(4), pages 641-657, November.
  5. Djajic, Slobodan & Milbourne, Ross, 1988. "A general equilibrium model of guest-worker migration : The source-country perspective," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3-4), pages 335-351, November.
  6. Stark, Oded & Helmenstein, Christian & Yegorov, Yuri, 1997. "Migrants' Savings, Purchasing Power Parity, and the Optimal Duration of Migration," Economics Series 44, Institute for Advanced Studies.
  7. Chau, Nancy H, 2001. "Strategic Amnesty and Credible Immigration Reform," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(3), pages 604-34, July.
  8. John M. Abowd & Richard B. Freeman, 1991. "Immigration, Trade, and the Labor Market," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number abow91-1, December.
  9. Gordon H. Hanson & Raymond Robertson & Antonio Spilimbergo, 2002. "Does Border Enforcement Protect U.S. Workers From Illegal Immigration?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(1), pages 73-92, February.
  10. Hill, John K., 1987. "Immigrant decisions concerning duration of stay and migratory frequency," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 221-234, February.
  11. Dustmann, Christian & Kirchkamp, Oliver, 2001. "The Optimal Migration Duration and Activity Choice after Re-migration," IZA Discussion Papers 266, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  12. Guido Friebel & Sergei Guriev, 2006. "Smuggling Humans: A Theory of Debt-financed Migration," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(6), pages 1085-1111, December.
  13. Karin Mayr & Steffen Minter & Tim Krieger, 2009. "Policies on illegal immigration in a federation," Working Papers CIE 23, University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics.
  14. Winegarden, C R & Khor, Lay Boon, 1991. "Undocumented Immigration and Unemployment of U.S. Youth and Minority Workers: Econometric Evidence," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(1), pages 105-12, February.
  15. Avi Weiss & Arye L. Hillman & Gil S. Epstein, 1999. "Creating illegal immigrants," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 3-21.
  16. Djajic, Slobodan, 1987. "Illegal aliens, unemployment and immigration policy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 235-249, February.
  17. Slobodan Djajic, 1999. "Dynamics of immigration control," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 45-61.
  18. Woodland, Alan D. & Yoshida, Chisato, 2006. "Risk preference, immigration policy and illegal immigration," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 500-513, December.
  19. Gathmann, Christina, 2008. "Effects of enforcement on illegal markets: Evidence from migrant smuggling along the southwestern border," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 1926-1941, October.
  20. Chiswick, Barry R, 1988. "Illegal Immigration and Immigration Control," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 101-15, Summer.
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