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Return Migration and Illegal Immigration Control

This paper investigates the e ectiveness of immigration control policies when the duration of stay of illegal immigrants is endogenous because they may return home voluntarily. It shows that return intentions matter. First, we nd that spending on border enforcement can potentially increase the total amount of illegal labor in the receiving country. This is because, while fewer illegals enter the country, those who do enter stay longer. Second, in-site inspections reduce illegal labor, unless there is an amnesty: then, they can have the opposite efect. Third,ones on apprehended migrants have only limited efect.

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File URL: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/Papers.Econ/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie1208.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number 1208.

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Date of creation: Dec 2012
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Handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:1208
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.univie.ac.at/vwl

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  1. Friebel, Guido & Guriev, Sergei, 2004. "Smuggling Humans: A Theory of Debt-Financed Migration," IZA Discussion Papers 1025, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Epstein, Gil S & Hillman, Arye L. & Weiss, Avi, 1998. "Creating Illegal Immigrants," CEPR Discussion Papers 1796, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Woodland, Alan D. & Yoshida, Chisato, 2006. "Risk preference, immigration policy and illegal immigration," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 500-513, December.
  4. John M. Abowd & Richard B. Freeman, 1991. "Immigration, Trade, and the Labor Market," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number abow91-1, October.
  5. Gordon H. Hanson & Raymond Robertson & Antonio Spilimbergo, 2002. "Does Border Enforcement Protect U.S. Workers From Illegal Immigration?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(1), pages 73-92, February.
  6. Entorf, Horst, 2000. "Rational migration policy should tolerate non-zero illegal migration flows: Lessons from modelling the market for illegal migration," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 23, University of Würzburg, Chair for Monetary Policy and International Economics.
  7. Chiswick, Barry R, 1988. "Illegal Immigration and Immigration Control," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 101-15, Summer.
  8. Epstein, Gil S & Weiss, Avi, 2001. "A Theory of Immigration Amnesties," CEPR Discussion Papers 2830, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Gathmann, Christina, 2008. "Effects of enforcement on illegal markets: Evidence from migrant smuggling along the southwestern border," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 1926-1941, October.
  10. Winegarden, C R & Khor, Lay Boon, 1991. "Undocumented Immigration and Unemployment of U.S. Youth and Minority Workers: Econometric Evidence," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(1), pages 105-12, February.
  11. Chau, Nancy H, 2001. "Strategic Amnesty and Credible Immigration Reform," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(3), pages 604-34, July.
  12. Karin Mayr & Steffen Minter & Tim Krieger, 2009. "Policies on illegal immigration in a federation," Working Papers CIE 23, University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics.
  13. Oded Stark & Christian Helmenstein & Yury Yegorov, 1997. "Migrants' Savings, Purchasing Power Parity, and the Optimal Duration of Migration," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 307-324, July.
  14. Ethier, Wilfred J, 1986. "Illegal Immigration: The Host-Country Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 56-71, March.
  15. Djajic, Slobodan, 1987. "Illegal aliens, unemployment and immigration policy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 235-249, February.
  16. Dustmann, Christian & Kirchkamp, Oliver, 2002. "The optimal migration duration and activity choice after re-migration," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-372, April.
  17. Hill, John K., 1987. "Immigrant decisions concerning duration of stay and migratory frequency," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 221-234, February.
  18. Slobodan Djajic, 1999. "Dynamics of immigration control," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 45-61.
  19. Djajic, Slobodan & Milbourne, Ross, 1988. "A general equilibrium model of guest-worker migration : The source-country perspective," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3-4), pages 335-351, November.
  20. Nicola D. Coniglio & Giuseppe De Arcangelis & Laura Serlenga, 2009. "Intentions to Return of Clandestine Migrants: The Perverse Effect of Illegality on Skills," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(4), pages 641-657, November.
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