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Sale of Visas: A Smuggler’s Final Song?

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Listed:
  • Emmanuelle Auriol

    () (Toulouse School of Economics (ARQADE and IDEI) and CEPR)

  • Alice Mesnard

    (City University, Institute for Fiscal Studies and CEPR)

Abstract

Is there a way of eliminating human smuggling? We set up a model to simultaneously determine the provision of human smuggling services and the demand from would-be migrants. A visa-selling policy may be successful at eliminating human smugglers by eroding their profits but it necessarily increases immigration. In contrast, re-enforced repression decreases migration but uses the help of cartelized smugglers. To overcome this trade-off we study how legalisation and repression can be combined to eliminate human smuggling while controlling migration flows. This policy mix also has the advantage that the funds raised by visa sales can be used to finance additional investments in border and internal controls (employer sanctions and deportations). Simulations of the policy implications highlight the complementarities between repression and legalisation and call into question the current policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Emmanuelle Auriol & Alice Mesnard, 2012. "Sale of Visas: A Smuggler’s Final Song?," Norface Discussion Paper Series 2012007, Norface Research Programme on Migration, Department of Economics, University College London.
  • Handle: RePEc:nor:wpaper:2012007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Emmanuelle Auriol & Alice Mesnard, 2016. "Sale of Visas: a Smuggler's Final Song?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(332), pages 646-678, October.
    2. Fernández-Huertas Moraga, Jesús & Rapoport, Hillel, 2014. "Tradable immigration quotas," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 94-108.
    3. Herbert Brücker & Nina Rother & Jürgen Schupp (Hrsg.), 2016. "IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Befragung von Geflüchteten: Überblick und erste Ergebnisse," DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, volume 116, number pbk116, January.
    4. repec:bla:reviec:v:25:y:2017:i:5:p:1017-1045 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Guido, Friebel & Miriam, Manchin & Mariapia, Mendola & Giovanni, Prarolo, 2017. "Human Smuggling and Intentions to Migrate: Global Evidence from a Supply Shock along Africa-to-Europe Migration Routes," Working Papers 375, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 06 Dec 2017.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    migration; migration policies; market structure; legalisation; human smuggling.;

    JEL classification:

    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration

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