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Migrant smuggling when exploitation is private information

Author

Listed:
  • Yuji Tamura

Abstract

This study contributes to the small theoretical literature on human smuggling by assuming for the first time asymmetric information in analysis. The assumption raises the possibility of an adverse selection equilibrium where only exploitative smugglers are employed at a low fee even though migrants are willing to pay nonexploitative smugglers a high fee. More importantly, I find that improved inland apprehension of migrants may increase the incidence of migrant exploitation while failing to decrease smuggling attempts. Furthermore, improved border apprehension of migrants and smugglers may not affect the market at all.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuji Tamura, 2013. "Migrant smuggling when exploitation is private information," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2013-605, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2013-605
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    File URL: https://www.cbe.anu.edu.au/researchpapers/econ/wp605.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Emmanuelle Auriol & Alice Mesnard, 2016. "Sale of Visas: a Smuggler's Final Song?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(332), pages 646-678, October.
    2. Slobodan Djajić, 2015. "Financial Support from the Family Network and Illegal Immigration," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(2), pages 387-403, May.
    3. Slobodan Djajić & Michael S. Michael, 2014. "Controlling Illegal Immigration: On the Scope for Cooperation with a Transit Country," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(4), pages 808-824, September.
    4. Naiditch, Claire & Vranceanu, Radu, 2020. "A matching model of the market for migrant smuggling services," ESSEC Working Papers WP2002, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
    5. Slobodan Djajić & Alexandra Vinogradova, 2019. "Immigration Policies and the Choice between Documented and Undocumented Migration," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 86(341), pages 201-228, January.
    6. Slobodan Djajić, 2017. "Transit migration," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(5), pages 1017-1045, November.
    7. Djajić, Slobodan & Vinogradova, Alexandra, 2014. "Liquidity-constrained migrants," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 210-224.
    8. Muhammad Iqbal, 2017. "Border Communities Understanding on The Human Trafficking in Indonesia-Malaysia Border Region: Case Study in Sambas District, West Kalimantan," GATR Journals jmmr166, Global Academy of Training and Research (GATR) Enterprise.
    9. Auriol, A. & Mesnard, A., 2013. "Sale of visas: a smuggler's final song?," Working Papers 13/06, Department of Economics, City St George's, University of London.
    10. Olivier Charlot & Claire Naiditch & Radu Vranceanu, 2024. "Smuggling of forced migrants to Europe: a matching model," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 37(1), pages 1-29, March.
    11. Djajić, Slobodan, 2014. "Asylum seeking and irregular migration," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 83-95.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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