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Illegal migration and policy enforcement

Author

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  • Mangin, Sephorah
  • Zenou, Yves

Abstract

Workers from a source country consider whether or not to illegally migrate to a host country. This decision depends crucially on the proportion of workers who migrate and on whether or not the host country government decides to regularize them. When there is no uncertainty about economic conditions in the host country, there are multiple equilibria where workers may migrate or not and the government may regularize them or not. When uncertainty is introduced, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium where each state of the world gives rise to a unique outcome in terms of migration and regularization.

Suggested Citation

  • Mangin, Sephorah & Zenou, Yves, 2016. "Illegal migration and policy enforcement," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 83-86.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:148:y:2016:i:c:p:83-86
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.09.012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dibeh, Ghassan & Fakih, Ali & Marrouch, Walid, 2018. "Labor Market and Institutional Drivers of Youth Irregular Migration: Evidence from the MENA Region," IZA Discussion Papers 11903, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Verdier, Thierry & Zenou, Yves, 2017. "The role of social networks in cultural assimilation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 15-39.
    3. Kaz Miyagiwa & Yoshiyasu Ono, 2019. "Immigration and Secular Stagnation," ISER Discussion Paper 1054, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
    4. Kaz Miyagiwa & Yoshiyasu Ono, 2019. "Immigration and Secular Stagnation," ISER Discussion Paper 1054r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jun 2019.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Illegal migration; International migration; Global games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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