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Enforcement and illegal migration

Author

Listed:
  • Pia Orrenius

    (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, USA, and IZA, Germany)

Abstract

Border enforcement of immigration laws attempts to raise the costs of illegal immigration, while interior enforcement also lowers the benefits. Border and interior enforcement therefore reduce the net benefits of illegal immigration and should lower the probability that an individual will decide to migrate. While some empirical studies find that border and interior enforcement serve as significant deterrents to illegal immigration, immigration enforcement is costly and carries significant unintended consequences, such as an increase in fraudulent and falsified documents and rising border death rates as migrants undertake more dangerous crossings.

Suggested Citation

  • Pia Orrenius, 2014. "Enforcement and illegal migration," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 1-81, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izawol:journl:y:2014:n:81
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Antonio Spilimbergo & Gordon H. Hanson, 1999. "Illegal Immigration, Border Enforcement, and Relative Wages: Evidence from Apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico Border," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1337-1357, December.
    2. Samuel Bazzi & Gordon Hanson & Sarah John & Bryan Roberts & John Whitley, 2021. "Deterring Illegal Entry: Migrant Sanctions and Recidivism in Border Apprehensions," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 1-27, August.
    3. Orrenius, Pia M. & Zavodny, Madeline, 2005. "Self-selection among undocumented immigrants from Mexico," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 215-240, October.
    4. Manuela Angelucci, 2012. "US Border Enforcement and the Net Flow of Mexican Illegal Migration," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 60(2), pages 311-357.
    5. Gathmann, Christina, 2008. "Effects of enforcement on illegal markets: Evidence from migrant smuggling along the southwestern border," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 1926-1941, October.
    6. Ethier, Wilfred J, 1986. "Illegal Immigration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 258-262, May.
    7. repec:wly:soecon:v:81:4:y:2015:p:947-959 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Ethier, Wilfred J, 1986. "Illegal Immigration: The Host-Country Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 56-71, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pia M. Orrenius, 2001. "Illegal immigration and enforcement along the U.S.-Mexico border; an overview," Economic and Financial Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, issue Q I, pages 2-11.
    2. Fernanda Martínez Flores, 2020. "The Effects of Enhanced Enforcement at Mexico’s Southern Border: Evidence From Central American Deportees," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 57(5), pages 1597-1623, October.
    3. Pia M. Orrenius & Madeline Zavodny, 2017. "Unauthorized Mexican Workers in the United States: Recent Inflows and Possible Future Scenarios," Working Papers 1701, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    illegal immigration; border enforcement; interior enforcement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J15 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
    • K37 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Immigration Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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