IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp1694.html

Immigration and Outsourcing: A General Equilibrium Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu

    (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis)

  • Wall, Howard J.

    (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the issues of immigration and outsourcing in a general-equilibrium model of international factor mobility. In our model, legal immigration is controlled through a quota, while outsourcing is determined both by the firms (in response to market conditions) and through policy-imposed barriers. A loosening of the immigration quota reduces outsourcing, enriches capitalists, leads to losses for native workers, and raises national income. If the nation targets an exogenously determined immigration level, the second-best outsourcing tax can be either positive or negative. If in addition to the immigration target there is a wage target (arising out of income distribution concerns), an outsourcing subsidy is required. The analysis is extended to consider illegal immigration and enforcement policy. A higher legal immigration quota will lead to more illegal immigration if skilled and unskilled labor are complements in production. If the two kinds of labor are complements (substitutes), national income increases (decreases) monotonically with the level of legal immigration.

Suggested Citation

  • Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu & Wall, Howard J., 2005. "Immigration and Outsourcing: A General Equilibrium Analysis," IZA Discussion Papers 1694, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1694
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://docs.iza.org/dp1694.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ravi Batra & Hamid Beladi, 2010. "A Simple Two‐Sector Model of Outsourcing," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 64-73, February.
    2. Giorgio Barba Navaretti & Giuseppe Bertola & Alessandro Sembenelli, 2008. "Offshoring and Immigrant Employment: Firm-level Theory and Evidence," Development Working Papers 245, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano.
    3. Gianluca Orefice, 2014. "Offshoring, migrants and native workers: The optimal choice under asymmetric information," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(2), pages 179-201, March.
    4. Hübler, Michael, 2007. "A simple model of outsourcing with Cournot competition," Kiel Working Papers 1320, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    5. Andreas Hatzigeorgiou & Patrik Karpaty & Richard Kneller & Magnus Lodefalk, 2024. "Immigrant employment and the contract enforcement costs of offshoring," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 160(3), pages 953-981, August.
    6. Cosimo Beverelli & Gianluca Orefice & Nadia Rocha, 2016. "The Impact of Offshoring and Migration Policies on Migration Flows," Working Papers 2016-21, CEPII research center.
    7. Joseph Pelzman, 2013. "“Womb for Rent”: International Service Trade Employing Assisted Reproduction Technologies (ARTs)," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(3), pages 387-400, August.
    8. Simontini Das & Ajitava Raychaudhuri & Saikat Sinha Roy, 2012. "Immigration Versus Outsourcing: A Developing Country¡¯S View," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 37(2), pages 109-138, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade
    • F2 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • J1 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics
    • J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1694. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Holger Hinte (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/izaaade.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.