IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Illegal immigration and multiple destinations

Listed author(s):
  • MIYAGIWA, Kaz
  • SATO, Yasuhiro

This paper examines the efficacy of internal and external enforcement policy to combat illegal immigration. The model features search-theoretic unemployment and policy interdependency among multiple destination countries. With one destination country, internal and external enforcement policy have similar effects. With multiple destination countries, we consider prototypal geographical configurations. In one, all destinations are contiguous with the source country, while in the other only one destination country is contiguous with the source country. In both cases the equilibrium external enforcement policy level is lower than the joint optimum, calling for supranational authorities to implement immigration policy. In the absence of such policy, we consider the effect of delegating border control policy to one destination country and find that delegation of authorities to the largest country can improve each destination country ’s welfare relative to the Nash equilibrium level.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/27476/1/070_hiasDP-E-10.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion paper series with number HIAS-E-10.

as
in new window

Length: 29, [3] p.
Date of creation: 15 Sep 2015
Handle: RePEc:hit:hiasdp:hias-e-10
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Faculty Building II, 2-1, Naka, Kunitachi, 186 - 8601

Phone: (+81) 42 – 580 - 8604
Fax: (+81) 42 – 580 - 8605
Web page: http://hias.ad.hit-u.ac.jp/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Giordani, Paolo E. & Ruta, Michele, 2013. "Coordination failures in immigration policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 55-67.
  2. Christopher A. Pissarides, 2000. "Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262161877, July.
  3. Zenou,Yves, 2009. "Urban Labor Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521698221.
  4. Anke S. Kessler & Christoph Lülfesmann & Gordon M. Myers, 2002. "Redistribution, Fiscal Competition, and the Politics of Economic Integration," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(4), pages 899-923.
  5. Ethier, Wilfred J, 1986. "Illegal Immigration: The Host-Country Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 56-71, March.
  6. Andri Chassamboulli & Theodore Palivos, 2014. "A Search‐Equilibrium Approach To The Effects Of Immigration On Labor Market Outcomes," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55, pages 111-129, 02.
  7. J. Hirshleifer, 1985. "From weakest-link to best-shot: Correction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 221-223, January.
  8. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(2), pages 269-304, June.
  9. Bond, Eric W. & Chen, Tain-Jy, 1987. "The welfare effects of illegal immigration," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 315-328, November.
  10. Jack Hirshleifer, 1983. "From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 371-386, January.
  11. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
  12. Zodrow, George R. & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1986. "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 356-370, May.
  13. Wilson, John D., 1986. "A theory of interregional tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 296-315, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hit:hiasdp:hias-e-10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Digital Resources Section, Hitotsubashi University Library)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.