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Coordination Failures in Immigration Policy

Author

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  • Paolo Giordani

    (Università Luiss "Guido Carli")

  • Michele Ruta

    (World Trade Organization)

Abstract

We propose a theoretical framework for analyzing the problems associated to unilateral immigration policy in receiving countries and for evaluating the grounds for reform of international institutions governing immigration. We build a model with multiple destination countries and show that immigration policy in one country is influenced by measures adopted abroad as migrants choose where to locate (in part) in response to differences in immigration policy. This interdependence gives rise to a leakage effect of immigration policy, an international externality well documented in the empirical literature. In this environment, immigration policy becomes strategic and unilateral behavior may lead to coordination failures, where receiving countries are stuck in welfare inferior equilibria. We then study the conditions under which a coordination failure is more likely to emerge and argue that multilateral institutions that help receiving countries make immigration policy commitments would address this inefficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Paolo Giordani & Michele Ruta, 2011. "Coordination Failures in Immigration Policy," Working Papers LuissLab 1190, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, LUISS Guido Carli.
  • Handle: RePEc:lui:lleewp:1190
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    Cited by:

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    2. Beverelli, Cosimo & Orefice, Gianluca, 2019. "Migration deflection: The role of Preferential Trade Agreements," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    3. Kaz Miyagiwa & Yoshiyasu Ono, 2019. "Immigration and Secular Stagnation," ISER Discussion Paper 1054, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
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    5. Simone Bertoli & Jesus Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2012. "Visa Policies, Networks and the Cliff at the Border," Working Papers 2012-12, FEDEA.
    6. Simone Bertoli & Jesús Fernandez-Huertas Moraga, 2018. "The Effect of Visa Policies on International Migration Flows," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 16(01), pages 38-41, May.
    7. Bertoli, Simone & Moraga, Jesús Fernández-Huertas & Guichard, Lucas, 2020. "Rational inattention and migration decisions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    8. MIYAGIWA Kaz & SATO Yasuhiro, 2015. "Illegal Immigration and Multiple Destinations," Discussion papers 15116, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    9. Kenji Kondoh, 2020. "A paradoxical immigration restriction policy for unskilled illegal immigrants," Asia-Pacific Journal of Regional Science, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 479-497, June.
    10. Kaz Miyagiwa & Yoshiyasu Ono, 2019. "Immigration and Secular Stagnation," ISER Discussion Paper 1054r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jun 2019.
    11. Rayp, Glenn & Ruyssen, Ilse & Standaert, Samuel, 2017. "Measuring and Explaining Cross-Country Immigration Policies," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 141-163.
    12. Krieger, Tim & Renner, Laura & Schmid, Lena, 2019. "Where do migrants from countries ridden by environmental conflict settle? On the scale, selection and sorting of conflict-induced migration," Discussion Paper Series 2019-03, University of Freiburg, Wilfried Guth Endowed Chair for Constitutional Political Economy and Competition Policy.
    13. Paolo E. Giordani & Michele Ruta, 2016. "Self-confirming immigration policy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(2), pages 361-378.
    14. Floriana Cerniglia & Laura Pagani, 2014. "Political knowledge and attitudes toward (de)centralization in Europe," Working Papers 272, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2014.
    15. Kaz Miyagiwa & Yunyun Wan, 2020. "Illegal immigrants, crime, and sanctuary cities," Discussion Papers 2012, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University, revised Aug 2020.
    16. Kaz Miyagiwa & Yasuhiro Sato, 2019. "Illegal immigration, unemployment, and multiple destinations," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 118-144, January.
    17. Martínez Flores, Fernanda, 2018. "The deterrence effect of immigration enforcement in transit countries: Evidence from Central American deportees," Ruhr Economic Papers 749, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    18. Fernanda Martínez Flores, 2020. "The Effects of Enhanced Enforcement at Mexico’s Southern Border: Evidence From Central American Deportees," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 57(5), pages 1597-1623, October.
    19. Bertoli, Simone & Fernández-Huertas Moraga, Jesús, 2015. "The size of the cliff at the border," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 1-6.
    20. Michal BURZYNSKI, 2018. "Time, Space and Skill in Designing Migration Policy," JODE - Journal of Demographic Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(4), pages 355-417, December.
    21. Marchal, Léa & Naiditch, Claire, 2016. "A micro-funded theory of multilateral resistance to migration," Kiel Working Papers 2051, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    22. Yuji Tamura, 2017. "Asylum providers: Hawks or Doves?," CEPR Discussion Papers 699, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Immigration policy; cross-border externalities; coordination failures; multilateral institutions.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers

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