IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/expeco/v10y2007i3p205-220.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Evidence on learning in coordination games

Author

Listed:
  • John Huyck

    ()

  • Raymond Battalio
  • Frederick Rankin

    ()

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • John Huyck & Raymond Battalio & Frederick Rankin, 2007. "Evidence on learning in coordination games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(3), pages 205-220, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:10:y:2007:i:3:p:205-220
    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-007-9175-z
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10683-007-9175-z
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-248, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fabrice Le Lec & Ondrej Rydval & Astrid Matthey, 2014. "Efficiency and Punishment in a Coordination Game: Voluntary Sanctions in the Minimum Effort Game," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp526, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    2. Fabrice Le Lec & Astrid Matthey & Ondrej Rydval, 2012. "Punishment Fosters Efficiency in the Minimum Effort Coordination Game," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-030, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    3. Masiliƫnas, Aidas, 2017. "Overcoming coordination failure in a critical mass game: Strategic motives and action disclosure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 214-251.
    4. Banerjee, Simanti & Kwasnica, Anthony M & Shortle, James S, 2011. "Agglomeration Bonus in Local Networks: A laboratory examination of spatial coordination failure," Stirling Economics Discussion Papers 2011-18, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
    5. Vincent Mak & Rami Zwick, 2010. "Investment Decisions and Coordination Problems in a Market with Network Externalities: An Experimental Study," Post-Print hal-00911829, HAL.
    6. Giordani, Paolo E. & Ruta, Michele, 2013. "Coordination failures in immigration policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 55-67.
    7. Marianne Lefebvre, 2011. "Sharing Rules for Common-Pool Resources when Self-insurance is Available: an Experiment," Working Papers 11-22, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jun 2012.
    8. Sandra Polania-Reyes, 2016. "Disentangling Social Capital: Lab-in-the-Field Evidence on Coordination, Networks, and Cooperation," Artefactual Field Experiments 00565, The Field Experiments Website.
    9. Banerjee, Simanti & Kwasnica, Anthony M. & Shortle, James S., 2012. "Agglomeration bonus in small and large local networks: A laboratory examination of spatial coordination," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 142-152.
    10. Di Girolamo, Amalia & Drouvelis, Michalis, 2015. "The role of gender composition and size of the group in a minimum effort game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 168-170.
    11. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Shakun Mago & Laura Razzolini, 2014. "Traffic congestion: an experimental study of the Downs-Thomson paradox," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(3), pages 461-487, September.
    12. Mak, Vincent & Zwick, Rami, 2010. "Investment decisions and coordination problems in a market with network externalities: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 759-773, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:10:y:2007:i:3:p:205-220. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.