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An incentive mechanism to break the low-skill immigration deadlock

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  • DE LA CROIX, David

    () (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL). Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))

  • DOCQUIER, Frédéric

    () (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL). Institut de recherches économiques ( IRES))

Abstract

The international mobility of low-skilled workers is constrained by immigration restrictions set by rich countries, preventing extreme poverty from declining in the developing world. Under aversion to extreme poverty, one country's immigration policy affects the welfare of other countries: "nationalist" political decisions are subject to a prisoner's dilemma. Taking advantage of efficiency gains from coordination, we propose an alternative allocation of labor, which minimizes extreme poverty while keeping rich countries as well off as in the nationalist situation. This allocation can be decentralized through international taxes and subsidies. Numerical simulations show that the role of aversion to poverty is negligible when considering each country separately, but becomes important for the design of a coordinated migration policy. (Copyright: Elsevier)
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(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • DE LA CROIX, David & DOCQUIER, Frédéric, 2009. "An incentive mechanism to break the low-skill immigration deadlock," CORE Discussion Papers 2009053, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2009053
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Fernández-Huertas Moraga, Jesús & Rapoport, Hillel, 2014. "Tradable immigration quotas," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 94-108.
    2. Frédéric Docquier & Joël Machado & Khalid Sekkat, 2015. "Efficiency Gains from Liberalizing Labor Mobility," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(2), pages 303-346, April.
    3. Giordani, Paolo E. & Ruta, Michele, 2013. "Coordination failures in immigration policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 55-67.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    public good; inequality aversion; immigration policy;

    JEL classification:

    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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