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Migration regulation contagion

Author

Listed:
  • Herbert Brücker

    (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), University of Bamberg, and IZA Bonn, Germany)

  • Philipp JH Schröder

    () (Business and Social Science, Aarhus University, Denmark)

Abstract

This article examines the political economy of selective immigration policy in a model where decision makers are uncertain about the characteristics of migrants. The analysis focuses on two questions: first, how does a selective immigration policy affect the number of immigrants who are admitted by the receiving country; second, how does a selective immigration policy in one country affect immigration policies in other countries. We find (i) that countries with selective immigration policies ceteris paribus tend to admit more migrants than countries without such policies, and (ii) that neighbouring countries will follow each other in implementing selective immigration policies, i.e. there is diffusion. These theoretical findings are supported by evidence from an econometric panel analysis of immigration policies in 15 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in the period from 1980 to 2005.

Suggested Citation

  • Herbert Brücker & Philipp JH Schröder, 2011. "Migration regulation contagion," European Union Politics, , vol. 12(3), pages 315-335, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:12:y:2011:i:3:p:315-335
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Giovanni Facchini & Anna Maria Mayda, 2008. "From individual attitudes towards migrants to migration policy outcomes: Theory and evidence," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 23, pages 651-713, October.
    2. Facchini, Giovanni & Mayda, Anna Maria & Mishra, Prachi, 2011. "Do interest groups affect US immigration policy?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 114-128, September.
    3. Tito Boeri & Herbert Brücker, 2005. "Why are Europeans so tough on migrants?," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 20(44), pages 629-703, October.
    4. Holger Bonin & Bernd Raffelhüschen & Jan Walliser, 2000. "Can Immigration Alleviate the Demographic Burden?," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(1), pages 1-1, September.
    5. Giovanni Facchini & Anna Maria Mayda, 2009. "Does the Welfare State Affect Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants? Evidence across Countries," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 91(2), pages 295-314, May.
    6. Grogger, Jeffrey & Hanson, Gordon H., 2011. "Income maximization and the selection and sorting of international migrants," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 42-57, May.
    7. David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, 2004. "Money, Sex and Happiness: An Empirical Study," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(3), pages 393-415, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Giordani, Paolo E. & Ruta, Michele, 2013. "Coordination failures in immigration policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 55-67.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    immigration regulation; incomplete information; international migration; policy diffusion; political economy of migration; screening; skill-selective immigration policies;

    JEL classification:

    • A10 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - General

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