IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Political Economy of International Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Model

  • Jaime MELO DE

    ()

    (Université Genève)

  • Jean Marie GRETHER

    (Université Genève)

  • Jean Claude MULLER

Determinants of national policies towards immigration are analysed in the context of an economy open to international trade. Arguments for the existence of an "immigration surplus" are reviewed and followed by an interpretation of the principal contributions of the political economy literature in a Ricardo-Viner model in a direct democracy framework. A median voter model is grafted on several variants of the specific-factor open-economy model to discuss several recent changes in attitudes towards immigration (a stiffened stance, especially towards the unskilled) and in national policies ("melting-pot" vs. guest-worker programs, coexistence of legal and illegal immigrants, lax enforcement towards illegals).

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://publi.cerdi.org/ed/2000/2000.21.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by CERDI in its series Working Papers with number 200021.

as
in new window

Length: 38
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cdi:wpaper:148
Contact details of provider: Postal: 65 Bd. F. Mitterrand, 63000 Clermont-Ferrand
Phone: (33-4) 73 17 74 00
Fax: (33-4) 73 17 74 28
Web page: http://cerdi.org/

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Findlay, Ronald, 1982. "International distributive justice : A trade theoretic approach," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1-2), pages 1-14, August.
  2. Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim & Swagel, Phillip, 2002. "Tax burden and migration: a political economy theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 167-190, August.
  3. Djajic, Slobodan, 1997. "Illegal Immigration and Resource Allocation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(1), pages 97-117, February.
  4. Razin, A. & Sadka, E., 1992. "International Migration and International Trade," Papers 11-92, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
  5. Ludema, Rodney D & Wooton, Ian, 1997. "Regional Integration, Trade, and Migration: Are Demand Linkages Relevant in Europe?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1656, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Epstein, Gil S. & Hillman, Arye L., 2000. "Social Harmony at the Boundaries of the Welfare State: Immigrants and Social Transfers," IZA Discussion Papers 168, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  7. Wildasin, D.E., 1991. "Ralaxation of Barriers to factor Mobilty and Income Redistribution," Papers 92-009, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
  8. Leamer, Edward E. & Levinsohn, James, 1995. "International trade theory: The evidence," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 26, pages 1339-1394 Elsevier.
  9. Razin, A. & Sadka, E., 1992. "Resisting Migration: Wage Rigidity and Income Redistribution," Papers 28-94, Tel Aviv.
  10. Buckley, F. H., 1996. "The political economy of immigration policies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 81-99, March.
  11. Trefler, Daniel, 1993. "International Factor Price Differences: Leontief Was Right!," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 961-87, December.
  12. Razin, A. & Sadka, E., 1999. "Unskilled Migration: a Burden or a Boon for the Welfare State?," Papers 8-99, Tel Aviv.
  13. George J. Borjas, 1994. "The Economic Benefits from Immigration," NBER Working Papers 4955, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Bulow, Jeremy I & Summers, Lawrence H, 1986. "A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application to Industrial Policy,Discrimination, and Keynesian Unemployment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(3), pages 376-414, July.
  15. Benhabib, Jess, 1996. "On the political economy of immigration," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1737-1743, December.
  16. Gordon H. Hanson & Antonio Spilimbergo, 1996. "Illegal Immigration, Border Enforcement, and Relative Wages: Evidence from Apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico Border," Research Department Publications 4036, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  17. Kenneth F. Scheve & Matthew J. Slaughter, 1999. "Labor-Market Competition and Individual Preferences Over Immigration Policy," NBER Working Papers 6946, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Gordon H. Hanson & Antonio Spilimbergo, 2001. "Political economy, sectoral shocks, and border enforcement," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 34(3), pages 612-638, August.
  19. Schiff, Maurice, 1999. "Labor market integration in the presence of social capital," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2222, The World Bank.
  20. David E. Wildasin, 1994. "Income Redistribution and Migration," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(3), pages 637-56, August.
  21. Klaus F. Zimmermann, 1995. "Tackling the European Migration Problems," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 45-62, Spring.
  22. Kenneth F. Scheve & Matthew J. Slaughter, 1998. "What Determines Individual Trade Policy Preferences?," NBER Working Papers 6531, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
  24. Berry, R Albert & Soligo, Ronald, 1969. "Some Welfare Aspects of International Migration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 77(5), pages 778-94, Sept./Oct.
  25. Hillman, Arye L. & Weiss, Avi, 1999. "A theory of permissible illegal immigration," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 585-604, November.
  26. M. R. Rosenzweig & Stark, O. (ed.), 1997. "Handbook of Population and Family Economics," Handbook of Population and Family Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
  27. Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim, 1999. "Migration and pension with international capital mobility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 141-150, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cdi:wpaper:148. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Vincent Mazenod)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.