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Social Harmony At The Boundaries Of The Welfare State: Immigrants And Social Transfers

Author

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  • Epstein, Gil S
  • Hillman, Arye L.

Abstract

The social contract of the welfare state can be strained by the arrival of immigrants who receive welfare payments financed by citizens' taxes. We show, however, that the presence of unemployed immigrants receiving welfare payments is consistent with social harmony. The social harmony, which is a consequence of a view of unemployment as a labour-market discipline, contrasts with the social conflict predicted by Karl Marx when he proposed his earlier version of the same explanation for unemployment. We demonstrate that a socially harmonious policy is always feasible. Outcomes without social harmony can therefore always be suitably amended.

Suggested Citation

  • Epstein, Gil S & Hillman, Arye L., 2000. "Social Harmony At The Boundaries Of The Welfare State: Immigrants And Social Transfers," CEPR Discussion Papers 2414, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2414
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jörgen W. Weibull, 1999. "Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(1), pages 1-35.
    2. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1995. " A Theory of the Welfare State," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(4), pages 495-526, December.
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    4. Snower, Dennis J., 1994. "What is the Domain of the Welfare State?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1018, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Ethier, Wilfred J, 1986. "Illegal Immigration: The Host-Country Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 56-71, March.
    6. Konrad, Kai A, 1994. "The Strategic Advantage of Being Poor: Private and Public Provision of Public Goods," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 61(241), pages 79-92, February.
    7. Hillman, Arye L. & Weiss, Avi, 1999. "A theory of permissible illegal immigration," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 585-604, November.
    8. Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J., 1991. "Interactions between the efficiency wage and insider-outsider theories," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 193-196, October.
    9. Epstein, Gil S & Hillman, Arye L & Ursprung, Heinrich W, 1999. "The King Never Emigrates," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(2), pages 107-121, June.
    10. Snower, Dennis J, 1993. "The Future of the Welfare State," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(418), pages 700-717, May.
    11. Lindbeck, Assar, 1994. "The Welfare State and the Employment Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 71-75, May.
    12. Faini,Riccardo C. & de Melo,Jaime & Zimmermann,Klaus (ed.), 1999. "Migration," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521662338, April.
    13. Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-477, June.
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    15. repec:hhs:iuiwop:476 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Marie Grether & Jaime de Melo & Tobias Müller, 2015. "The Political Economy of International Migration in a Ricardo–Viner Model," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Developing Countries in the World Economy, chapter 17, pages 411-437 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Epstein, Gil S & Weiss, Avi, 2001. "A Theory of Immigration Amnesties," CEPR Discussion Papers 2830, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. repec:eme:rleczz:s0147-9121(07)00007-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Andersson, Fredrik & Konrad, Kai A., 2001. "Globalization and Human Capital Formation," IZA Discussion Papers 245, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    5. Nannestad, Peter, 2009. "Unproductive immigrants: A socially optimal policy for rational egalitarians," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 562-566, December.
    6. Ira N. Gang & Myeong-Su Yun, 2007. "Immigration Amnesty and Immigrant's Earnings," Research in Labor Economics,in: Immigration, volume 27, pages 273-309 Emerald Publishing Ltd.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Immigrants; Social Harmony; Welfare State;

    JEL classification:

    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism

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