Migration, effort, and voter sentiment towards temporary migration
The sentiments felt by capital owners and local workers and consumers towards migrants may improve when temporary migration policies are adopted. The observed level of exertion of effort by migrants, which decreases during their duration in the host country, positively affects production, real wages and capital owners' profits. We show that the acceptance of job offers by migrants results in the displacement in employment of national workers by immigrants, but it increases the exertion of effort by workers, reduces prices, and acts as a counterweight to anti-immigrant voter attitudes.
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