Asylum Seekers in Europe: The Warm Glow of a Hot Potato
The Common European Asylum System calls for increased coordination of the EU countries’ policies towards asylum seekers and refugees. In this paper, we provide a formal analysis of the effects of coordination, explicitly modelling the democratic process through which policy is determined. In a symmetric, two-country citizen-candidate setup, in which accepting asylum seekers in one country generates a cross-border externality in the other, we show that coordination is desirable. Internalizing the externality leads to a welfare improvement over the non–cooperative outcome. However, contrary to suggestions by many observers, we show that allowing for cross-country transfers in the cooperative outcome leads to a welfare inferior outcome because the possibility of compensation exacerbates strategic delegation effects.
|Date of creation:||15 Jun 2005|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Via Conservatorio 7 - 20122 Milano|
Phone: +39 02 503 16486
Fax: +39 02 503 16475
Web page: http://www.dagliano.unimi.it/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Boeri, Tito & Hanson, Gordon H. & McCormick, Barry (ed.), 2002. "Immigration Policy and the Welfare System: A Report for the Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199256310.
- Timothy J. Hatton, 2004. "Seeking asylum in Europe," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 19(38), pages 5-62, 04.
- Segendorff, Bjorn, 1998. "Delegation and Threat in Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 266-283, May.
- John Douglas Wilson, 1990. "Are Efficiency Improvements In Government Transfer Policies Self-Defeating In Political Equilibrium?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(3), pages 241-258, November.
- Willmann, Gerald, 2003. "Why Legislators are Protectionists: The Role of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffs," Economics Working Papers 2003-10, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
- Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996.
"A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96.
- Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-01, McMaster University.
- Hatton, Timothy J. & Williamson, Jeffrey G, 2005.
"Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Policy in Europe,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5058, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hatton, Timothy J. & Williamson, Jeffrey G., 2004. "Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Policy in Europe," IZA Discussion Papers 1230, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Timothy J. Hatton & Jeffrey G. Williamson, 2004. "Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Policy in Europe," NBER Working Papers 10680, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2003. "Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2611-2637, December.
- Lorz, Jens Oliver & Willmann, Gerald, 2004.
"On the Endogenous Allocation of Decision Powers in Federal Structures,"
Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers
25, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
- Lorz, Oliver & Willmann, Gerald, 2005. "On the endogenous allocation of decision powers in federal structures," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 242-257, March.
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, "undated".
"An Economic Model of Representative Democracy,"
Penn CARESS Working Papers
ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:csl:devewp:205. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Chiara Elli)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.