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Redistribution, Fiscal Competition, and the Politics of Economic Integration

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Abstract

The paper examines the redistributive consequences of the economic integration of factor markets. We consider two countries that redistribute income among their residents. The social benefits in each country are financed by a source based tax on capital which is democratically chosen by its inhabitants. If either capital or labour is internationally mobile, the countries engage in fiscal competiton, i.e., the partial integration of capital or labour markets is detrimental to the countries' redistributive ability. A move from partial to full integration, however, may alleviate rather than intensify fiscal competition, particularly, if the two countries face sufficiently similar economic and political conditions. In such a situation, increased integration of labour markets will soften the incentives compete for mobile capital. As a result, there is more redistribution in equilibrium and a majority of the population in each country is strictly better off.

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  • Anke S. Kessler & Christoph Lulfesmann & Gordon Myers, 2000. "Redistribution, Fiscal Competition, and the Politics of Economic Integration," Discussion Papers dp00-11, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, revised Feb 2000.
  • Handle: RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp00-11
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    Cited by:

    1. Kangoh Lee, 2012. "Why is mobile capital taxed?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 107(2), pages 157-181, October.
    2. Lockwood, Ben & Makris, Miltiadis, 2006. "Tax incidence, majority voting and capital market integration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1007-1025, August.
    3. Haufler, Andreas & Lülfesmann, Christoph, 2015. "Reforming an asymmetric union: On the virtues of dual tier capital taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 116-127.
    4. Becker, Johannes & Fuest, Clemens, 2010. "EU regional policy and tax competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 150-161, January.
    5. Wolf Wagner & Sylvester Eijffinger, 2008. "Efficiency of capital taxation in an open economy: tax competition versus tax exportation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 15(6), pages 637-646, December.
    6. Thomas Moutos & William Scarth, 2003. "Some Macroeconomic Consequences of Basic Income and Employment Subsidies," CESifo Working Paper Series 916, CESifo.
    7. MIYAGIWA Kaz & SATO Yasuhiro, 2015. "Illegal Immigration and Multiple Destinations," Discussion papers 15116, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    8. Luelfesmann, Christoph & Kessler, Anke & Myers, Gordon M., 2015. "The architecture of federations: Constitutions, bargaining, and moral hazard," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 18-29.
    9. Brulhart, Marius & Jametti, Mario, 2006. "Vertical versus horizontal tax externalities: An empirical test," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 2027-2062, November.
    10. Lisa Grazzini & Alessandro Petretto, 2007. "Tax Competition between Unitary and Federal Countries," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 17-36, January.
    11. Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff, 2017. "The impressive contribution of Canadian economists to fiscal federalism theory and policy," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(5), pages 1348-1380, December.
    12. Janeba, Eckhard & Wilson, John Douglas, 2011. "Optimal fiscal federalism in the presence of tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1302-1311.
    13. Dima, Bogdan & Dima, Ştefana Maria & Barna, Flavia, 2014. "The signaling effect of tax rates under fiscal competition: A (Shannonian) transfer entropy approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 373-381.
    14. Gross, Till & Klein, Paul & Makris, Miltiadis, 2020. "Residence- and source-based capital taxation in open economies with infinitely-lived consumers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    15. Makris, Miltiadis, 2006. "Capital tax competition under a common currency," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 54-74, January.
    16. Karkalakos, Sotiris & Makris, Miltiadis, 2008. "Capital Tax Competition in the European Union: Theory and Evidence from Two Natural Experiments," MPRA Paper 21437, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2010.
    17. Kessler, Anke S. & Lulfesmann, Christoph & Myers, Gordon M., 2003. "Economic versus political symmetry and the welfare concern with market integration and tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 847-865, May.
    18. Huang, Wei Hong & Chen, Yang & Rudkin, Simon, 2014. "Dynamic Fiscal competition with public infrastructure investment: Austerity and attracting capital inflow," RIEI Working Papers 2014-03, Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, Research Institute for Economic Integration, revised 02 Mar 2016.
    19. Leon Bettendorf & Joeri Gorter & Albert van der Horst, 2006. "Who benefits from tax competition in the European Union?," CPB Document 125, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    20. Susana Peralta, 2007. "Political Support for Tax Decentralization," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(6), pages 1013-1030, December.
    21. Ihori, Toshihiro & Yang, C.C., 2009. "Interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition: The optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 210-217, November.
    22. Kessler, Anke S. & Lulfesmann, Christoph, 2005. "Tiebout and redistribution in a model of residential and political choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2-3), pages 501-528, February.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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