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Why is mobile capital taxed?

  • Kangoh Lee


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    The government for a jurisdiction has both capital and labor taxes at its disposal. It taxes mobile capital to finance the public good despite the desire to attract capital and despite the tax on immobile labor if capital incomes are distributed more unequally than labor incomes among the residents of the jurisdiction. The result extends to progressive taxes and to pure redistribution. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economics.

    Volume (Year): 107 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 2 (October)
    Pages: 157-181

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:107:y:2012:i:2:p:157-181
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