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Tax Incidence, Majority Voting And Capital Market Integration

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  • Lockwood, Ben

    (Department of Economics and CSGR)

  • Makris, Miltiadis

    (Department of Economics, University of Exeter, CMPO, University of Bristol and IMOP, Athens University of Economics and Business)

Abstract

We re-examine, from a political economy perspective, the standard view that higher capital mobility results in lower capital taxes - a view, in fact, that is not confirmed by the available empirical evidence. We show that when a small economy is opened to capital mobility, the change of incidence of a tax on capital - from capital owners to owners of the immobile factor - may interact in such a way with political decision-making so as to cause a rise in the equilibrium tax. This can happen whether or not the fixed factor (labour) can be taxed.

Suggested Citation

  • Lockwood, Ben & Makris, Miltiadis, 2004. "Tax Incidence, Majority Voting And Capital Market Integration," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 712, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:712
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:juecon:v:104:y:2018:i:c:p:94-103 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Hsun Chu & Chu-Chuan Cheng & Yu-Bong Lai, 2015. "A political economy of tax havens," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(6), pages 956-976, December.
    3. Hsun Chu, 2014. "Tax Enforcement Policy and the Provision of Public Goods with the Presence of Tax Havens," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 61(3), pages 304-321, July.
    4. Angelopoulos, Konstantinos & Economides, George & Kammas, Pantelis, 2012. "Does cabinet ideology matter for the structure of tax policies?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 620-635.
    5. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & George Economides & Pantelis Kammas, 2009. "Do political incentives matter for tax policies? Ideology, opportunism and the tax structure," Working Papers 2009_12, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    6. Manmohan S. Kumar & Dennis P. Quinn, 2012. "Globalization and Corporate Taxation," IMF Working Papers 12/252, International Monetary Fund.
    7. MORITA Tadashi & SATO Yasuhiro & YAMAMOTO Kazuhiro, 2016. "Demographics and Tax Competition in Political Economy," Discussion papers 16091, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    8. Hayato Kato, 2017. "Lobbying and Tax Competition in an Oligopolistic Industry: A Reverse Home Market Effect," Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series 2017-028, Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University.
    9. Rüdiger Pethig & Frieder Kolleß, 2009. "Asymmetric Capital-Tax Competition, Unemployment and Losses from Capital Market Integration," CESifo Working Paper Series 2795, CESifo Group Munich.
    10. Zissimos, Ben & Wooders, Myrna, 2008. "Public good differentiation and the intensity of tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 1105-1121, June.
    11. Zissimos, Ben & Wooders, Myrna, 2005. "Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 737, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    12. repec:bla:ecopol:v:29:y:2017:i:3:p:237-251 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Nelly Exbrayat & Benny Geys, 2016. "Economic Integration, Corporate Tax Incidence and Fiscal Compensation," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(11), pages 1792-1811, November.
    14. Lai, Yu-Bong, 2010. "The political economy of capital market integration and tax competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 475-487, December.
    15. Olena, Sokolovska, 2017. "Corporate tax incidence and its implications for the labor market," MPRA Paper 83401, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Yu-Bong Lai, 2014. "Asymmetric tax competition in the presence of lobbying," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 21(1), pages 66-86, February.

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