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The signaling effect of tax rates under fiscal competition: A (Shannonian) transfer entropy approach


  • Dima, Bogdan
  • Dima, Ştefana Maria
  • Barna, Flavia


The present paper argues that if the production factors are mobile, then the countries engaged in fiscal competition are less able to choose fully autonomously a taxation regime, since they have to prevent capital and labor migration. One significant consequence is that changes in neighbor states' fiscal policies may trigger asymmetric information flows between them. We used the (Shannonian) transfer entropy in describing such flows. This measure of information exchanges is useful given that it may be used to detect various types of asymmetry in the interaction among two systems and, thus, distinguishes between driving and responding forces. We examine the European Union's case for a time span between 1995 and 2011 and conclude that Northern Europe, the Germanic countries, the United Kingdom and Ireland are generating the dominant net information outflows.

Suggested Citation

  • Dima, Bogdan & Dima, Ştefana Maria & Barna, Flavia, 2014. "The signaling effect of tax rates under fiscal competition: A (Shannonian) transfer entropy approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 373-381.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:42:y:2014:i:c:p:373-381
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2014.07.007

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    References listed on IDEAS

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