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Heterogeneous firms, "Profit Shifting" FDI and international tax competition

  • Sebastian Krautheim

    ()

    (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics)

  • Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr

    ()

    (European University Institute - EUI)

Larger firms are more likely to use tax haven operations to exploit international tax differences. We study a tax game between a large country and a tax haven modeling heterogenous monopolistic firms, which can shift profits abroad. We shows that a higher degree of firm heterogeneity (a mean-preserving spread of the cost distribution) increases the degree of tax competition, i.e. it decreases the equilibrium tax rate of the large country, leads to higher outflows of its tax base and thus decreases its equilibrium tax revenue. Similar effects hold for a higher substitutability across varieties. We find that models with homogeneous firms understate the strenght of tax competition.

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Date of creation: Oct 2009
Publication status: Published in Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2009.73 - ISSN : 1955-611X. 2009
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00442818
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00442818
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