Immigration Control and the Welfare State
We examine immigratuon policy and its redistributive effects using a model of a rich country which must spend on border control in order to regulate immigration from a poor country. There are owners and workers in the rich country, and a public sector which makes redistributive transfers from owners to workers. We first consider the case where illegal immigrants have access to the public sector, a situation currently observed in many countries. We show that as border control becomes more expensive inequality in the rich country increases, redistributive transfers may increase or decrease, some immigration is permitted and foreign aid may be used by the rich country in order to reduce the migration pressure along its border with the poor country. Because of nonconvexities, we also show a small decrease in the aversion to collapse of the redistributive public sector. We then consider excluding illegal immigrants from the public sector (eg. Califronia Proposition 187). We find that the possibility of collapse vanishes and that the rich country takes the toughest official stance on migration but does not enforce it with border controls.
|Date of creation:||Jan 1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (905) 525-9140 ext. 22765
Fax: (905) 521-8232
Web page: http://www.economics.mcmaster.ca/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Wellisch, Dietmar & Wildasin, David E., 1996. "Decentralized income redistribution and immigration," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 187-217, January.
- Bond, Eric W. & Chen, Tain-Jy, 1987. "The welfare effects of illegal immigration," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 315-328, November.
- Mansoorian, Arman & Myers, Gordon M., 1997.
"On the consequences of government objectives for economies with mobile populations,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 265-281, January.
- Myers, G.M. & Mansoorian, A., 1995. "On the Consequences of Government Objectives for Economies with Mobile Populations," Papers 95-2, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
- Ethier, Wilfred J, 1986. "Illegal Immigration: The Host-Country Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 56-71, March.
- Klaus F. Zimmermann, 1995. "Tackling the European Migration Problems," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 45-62, Spring.
- Wildasin, D.E., 1992.
"Income Restribution and Migration,"
92-003, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
- Chiswick, Barry R, 1988. "Illegal Immigration and Immigration Control," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 101-15, Summer.
- Djajic, Slobodan, 1987. "Illegal aliens, unemployment and immigration policy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 235-249, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mcm:deptwp:1997-01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.