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Optimal Immigration Policy When the Public Good Is Rival

Author

Listed:
  • Stefano Bosi

    () (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - Université de Cergy Pontoise - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Eleni Iliopulos

    () (CEPREMAP - Centre pour la recherche économique et ses applications, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics)

  • Hubert Jayet

    () (EQUIPPE - Economie Quantitative, Intégration, Politiques Publiques et Econométrie - Université de Lille, Sciences et Technologies - Université de Lille, Sciences Humaines et Sociales - PRES Université Lille Nord de France - Université de Lille, Droit et Santé)

Abstract

In this model, we characterize optimal immigration and fiscal policies in presence of a rival public good and heterogeneous discounting. Surprisingly, even if the government is benevolent towards natives only, it is optimal to keep borders open. Indeed, in the long run, patient natives hold the whole stock of capital, while impatient immigrants work. Moreover, since capital intensity is stationary, capital per native, consumption and the public good increase with the number of (immigrant) workers. This positive effect offsets the disutility deriving from the congestion of the public good. Howevern when we account for the costs associated to cultural heterogeneity, we find that it is optimal to regulate immigration inflows. We also interpret the long-run sensitivity of the optimal policy mix with respect to the fundamentals.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefano Bosi & Eleni Iliopulos & Hubert Jayet, 2010. "Optimal Immigration Policy When the Public Good Is Rival," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00544332, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00544332 Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00544332
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cuong Le Van & Yiannis Vailakis, 2003. "Existence of a competitive equilibrium in a one sector growth model with heterogeneous agents and irreversible investment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(4), pages 743-771, November.
    2. Le Van, Cuong & Nguyen, Manh-Hung & Vailakis, Yiannis, 2007. "Equilibrium dynamics in an aggregative model of capital accumulation with heterogeneous agents and elastic labor," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3-4), pages 287-317, April.
    3. O'Rourke, Kevin H. & Sinnott, Richard, 2006. "The determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 838-861, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cycles; Heterogenous discounting; public good; immigration policy; cycles.;

    JEL classification:

    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers

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