Rent-Seeking Firms, Consumer Groups, and the Social Costs of Monopoly
Do consumers' consumer-surplus (CS)-defending activities increase the social costs of monopoly compared to when consumers are inactive? Given just one rent-seeking firm, consumers' CS-defending activities generally increase the social costs of monopoly, but given two or more rent-seeking firms, such activities generally reduce the social costs. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 37 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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