The social cost of monopoly when consumers resist
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- Torsten Schmidt, 1992. "Rent-Seeking Firms And Consumers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 137-149, 07.
- Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989.
"Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers,"
Economics and Politics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, 03.
- Ellingsen, T., 1990.
"Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly,"
05-90, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
- Wenders, John T, 1987. "On Perfect Rent Dissipation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 456-59, June.
- Nti, Kofi O, 1999. " Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 415-30, March.
- Fabella, Raul V., 1995. "The social cost of rent seeking under countervailing opposition to distortionary transfers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 235-247, June.
- Baik, Kyung Hwan, 1999. "Rent-Seeking Firms, Consumer Groups, and the Social Costs of Monopoly," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(3), pages 541-53, July.
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