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Rent-Seeking Firms And Consumers: An Equilibrium Analysis

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  • TORSTEN SCHMIDT

Abstract

This paper examines the probability of success in a rent-seeking contest as a general function of the resources that both firms and consumers devote to lobbying the government. The object of lobbying is a possible restriction of market supply, where the likelihood that supply will be restricted to a given extent depends on everyone's lobbying efforts. In equilibrium the expected social loss due to rent-seeking activities is at most equal to the size of the contested rent, and this upper bound does not depend on the active participation of consumers in the contest. Markets in which supply is not restricted may also be associated with rent-seeking waste. Finally, consumers' rent-seeking efforts are shown to be socially productive, both on the margin and in total. Copyright 1992 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..

Suggested Citation

  • Torsten Schmidt, 1992. "Rent-Seeking Firms And Consumers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 137-149, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:4:y:1992:i:2:p:137-149
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    Cited by:

    1. Hans Haller & Richard Milam, 2010. "Protection at Stake," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 26, pages 267-286.
    2. Epstein, Gil S. & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2003. "The social cost of rent seeking when consumer opposition influences monopoly behavior," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 61-69, March.
    3. Kyung Hwan Baik, 1994. "Winner-Help-Loser Group Formation In Rent-Seeking Contests," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(2), pages 147-162, July.
    4. repec:elg:eechap:15325_4 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Douglas Davis & Robert Reilly, 1998. "Do too many cooks always spoil the stew? An experimental analysis of rent-seeking and the role of a strategic buyer," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 89-115, April.
    6. Epstein, Gil S. & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2004. "Strategic restraint in contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 201-210, February.
    7. Keem, Jung Hoon, 2001. "The social cost of monopoly when consumers resist," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 633-639, September.
    8. Jay S. Coggins, 1995. "Rent Dissipation And The Social Cost Of Price Policy," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(2), pages 147-166, July.
    9. Kahana, Nava & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1999. "Uncertain preassigned non-contestable and contestable rents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(9), pages 1705-1721, October.
    10. Gil Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006. "The struggle over migration policy," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 19(4), pages 703-723, October.
    11. Epstein, Gil S. & Mealem, Yosef, 2013. "Politicians, Governed vs. Non-Governed Interest Groups and Rent Dissipation," IZA Discussion Papers 7736, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    12. Gil Epstein & Yosef Mealem, 2015. "Politicians, governed versus non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(1), pages 133-149, July.

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