Who Contributes? A Strategic Approach to a European Immigration Policy
According to the Lisbon Treaty the increasing cost of enforcing the European border against immigration shall be shared among the EU members. Nonetheless, the Treaty is rather vague with respect to the "appropriate measures" to adopt in order to distribute the financial burden. Members who do not share their borders with source countries have an incentive to free ride on the other countries. We study a contribution game where a border country and a central country minimize a loss function with respect to their national immigration target. We consider both sequential and simultaneous decisions and we show that joint contribution occurs only if the immigration targets are not too different. Total contribution is higher when decisions are simultaneous, but the sequential framework achieves joint contribution under a wider difference in the national targets.
|Date of creation:||08 Feb 2012|
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|Publication status:||Published in IZA Journal of Migration, 2013, 2(16), 1-16|
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