Unions and the political economy of immigration
To study the political economy of immigration, we develop a common agency model where a trade union and a lobby of entrepreneurs offer contributions to the government to influence its decision on how many immigrants can enter the domestic economy. In the political equilibrium, anticipating that the union will use its power to raise the wage rate above the competitive level, the government sets the level of immigration above the socially optimal one. In this case, the union would be better off by foregoing its power on wage determination and engaging exclusively in the lobbying activity
|Date of creation:||2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA|
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- G. Bellettini & G. Ottaviano, 1999.
"Special Interests and Technological change,"
340, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Irmen, Andreas & Wigger, Berthold, 2001.
"Trade Union Objectives and Economic Growth,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3027, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Andreas Irmen & Berthold U. Wigger, 2001. "Trade Union Objectives and Economic Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series 551, CESifo Group Munich.
- Andreas Irmen & Berthold U. Wigger, 2000. "Trade Union Objectives and Economic Growth," CSEF Working Papers 34, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Kevin H. O'Rourke & Richard Sinnott, 2004.
"The Determinants of Individual Attitudes Towards Immigration,"
Trinity Economics Papers
20042, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
- O'Rourke, Kevin H. & Sinnott, Richard, 2006. "The determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 838-861, December.
- Gil Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006.
"The struggle over migration policy,"
Journal of Population Economics,
Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 19(4), pages 703-723, October.
- Hatton, Timothy J. & Williamson, Jeffrey G., 2004.
"International Migration in the Long-Run: Positive Selection, Negative Selection and Policy,"
IZA Discussion Papers
1304, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Timothy J. Hatton & Jeffrey G. Williamson, 2004. "International Migration in the Long-Run: Positive Selection, Negative Selection and Policy," NBER Working Papers 10529, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Timothy J. Hatton & Jeffrey G. Williamson, 2004. "International Migration in the Long-Run: Positive Selection, Negative Selection and Policy," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2038, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- J. Amegashie, 2004. "A political economy model of immigration quotas," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 255-267, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed004:494. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.